


JPRS-EER-90-067
14 MAY 1990



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INTRABLOC

Vatra Romaneasca Public Presentation Distorts Facts

90CH0085A Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO
in Hungarian 24 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Maria Adonyi Nagy: "Vatra, the Organization Which Does Not Incite Moods"]

[Text] The press office of the Bucharest organization of the Vatra Romaneasca announced that on Thursday, 19 April there would be a presentation on the following topic: foreign press reactions to the Transylvania events, and the viewing of video recordings taken in Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures]. After opening remarks made by Valentin Borda, a ROMPRESS representative indeed sampled both the Eastern and the Western press, but his presentation did not satisfy the curiosity of those present. Some indignant voices could be heard from the audience, claiming that they could read about these matters in the Romanian press, and that at this time they had come to the presentation to learn more. Many persons wanting to ask questions raised their hands; one succeeded in asking a question, but he was told by Mr. Borda that the Vatra Romaneasca does not want to incite moods, and therefore it would not be advisable to ask further questions, or at least the questions should be asked after the presentation of pictures.

Despite the fact that the news announcement promised pictures from Marosvasarhely, the presentation began with pictures from the 15 March celebration in Bereck. One could see people laying a wreath at Aron Gabor's birthplace in the center of town, and one could hear the reading of Petofi poems. Whoever expected to see proof of Hungarian criminal acts which would boil one's blood would have been rather dissatisfied. Or, they could have been dissatisfied, had the accompanying text been unbiased. Throughout this text, however, one could hear only about the presence of the Hungarian national flag, whereas, if one took a second look, and if the picture had not been taken so that the view of the Romanian flags was intentionally kept at a distance, one could also have discovered the latter, and in sizeable numbers. But the audience preferred to give credence to its ears and not to its eyes, and indeed in a room the size of a movie theater one could not see quite clearly the pictures taken from a distance shown on the distant TV screen, and then to distinguish the colors of the two flags. Nevertheless, a person familiar with both flags was (would have been) able to recognize the different stripes, and the loud yellow dot on the Romanian national flag. Just as persons familiar with Petofi poems would not get (would not have gotten) stuck on "Let us be slaves, or let us be free," if the commentary failed to state that these were Petofi poems and did not present the matter as if the Transylvanian Hungarian minority wanted to free itself here and now from its slave keepers, who, according to this distorted presentation, would be the Romanians of today.

Pictures from the Sepsiszentgyorgy [Sfintu-Gheorghe] festivities followed, with views and commentary similar to those described above. Part of the audience became increasingly enraged after having seen this many impertinent acts perpetrated by Hungarians, and having heard poems which called for a fight. On the other hand, a Romanian-language Sepsiszentgyorgy speaker bored the people around me, because even with the "best" of intentions one could not discover anything objectionable in that. The organizers did skip the end of the presentation. Now the real Marosvasarhely pictures followed; to their greatest surprise, however, it was only that Irish recording, the interview with major Solovastu, and the series of pictures about the weapons collection that was subsequently confiscated, as we had already seen on television. As a bonus, they showed an interview in [word illegible] in which a woman from the village blamed Hungarians for having taken all the food away from them, even bites of food were taken out of their mouths, and now, in exchange they do not even provide bread; and a man blames the Marosvasarhely (also Hungarian) telephone central station for the fact that their village was disconnected from the telephone network precisely during the days when they no longer dared to go to the city, but when they were concerned about the fate of their relatives and the wounded. (Another wave of outrage in the room. It would appear that those present from Bucharest had not tried to call Marosvasarhely in those days, otherwise they would have known that it was impossible to reach that city from Bucharest.)

During the intermission after the slide presentation a woman rose to speak: She said that she was a teacher from Marosvasarhely and that she was an eyewitness to the events there. She had intentionally missed her train so that she could take part in this meeting. She spoke calmly, using a balanced tone of voice; she did not have to catch her breath, as those who incite people do. She was Romanian; from the few sentences she uttered one could not tell whether her testimony would be unbiased or partial, and if so, which direction it would take. In any event, all she was able to say was that in her city, 90 percent of the schools operated Hungarian classrooms. (According to estimates made by people from Marosvasarhely, this ratio is probably correct, at least with respect to elementary schools.) Just why the organizers were not willing to listen to the teacher's report remains a puzzle. Were they afraid that she would express some truth that would be unpleasant to the organizers? Or perhaps, as they said, she might want to incite and agitate the audience? The fact is that following the sentence she uttered they turned up the volume on the TV set so that no one could understand another word of what the teacher had to say.

The audience was outraged and angered: Not even the Vatra Romaneasca wants to express the truth? Are they telling lies, are they concealing the truth the same way the press and the television do? Could it be that even the Vatra is composed of Securitate people, activists, and members of the Front?

The other matter that remains a puzzle in my view is the question of who those people who asked these questions were. Were these truly unbiased, curious people who had come there to learn more about the events in Marosvasarhely? (A voice in the room: "I don't care now if the truth is on the Hungarian side, as long as someone says so!") Or were they ultra-extremists for whom not even the Vatra Romaneasca is sufficiently radical? It is likely that people of both kinds were among them, and a substantial part of both groups left the room. The organizer called upon those who hung around to depart. He claimed that the room was leased to them only until that time. But after the loudest persons who were hanging around left, the organizer announced to those who stayed in the room that perhaps they might show the association's pictures taken in Gyulafehérvár and pictures about their organizing meeting, and most certainly, this presentation took place. Nevertheless, some voices that could be heard from the entrance hall made some of us leave.

Visible in the entry hall was an angry group of ultras to whom the Vatra Romaneasca appeared to be a friend of Hungarians, or at least a pious, weakling association. Comments like this were made: What we Romanians are doing is not tolerance, it's plain stupidity; One of Andras Suto's eyes has been made of glass ever since he suffered an accident in [year illegible], and that was the eye that fell out (or he himself removed) on 19 March; the forests in Szekely country are filled with Romanians who were hanged; let a Romanian try to take a vacation in Kovaszna, he will find out for himself; all six fatal victims of the Marosvasarhely events were Romanians (the official authorities speak of four victims only); the Hungarians enjoyed privileges even during the Ceausescu years; the chief culprits of Marosvasarhely are now escaping to Hungary, etc.

The Vatra representative who stepped out into the entrance hall to calm passions almost paid for doing so. All he was able to say in his own defense was that in Szekely country people were executed only during the days of the revolution, and those were secret police people. He recommended to the attention of the aggravated persons an article by Carolina Ilica that appeared in the 18 April issue of *TINERETAI LIBER* as an article which presents a true and unbiased view of the events. The newspaper continues to be engaged in rumor mongering.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Academic Interviewed on PDS Renewal

90GE0046B East Berlin WOCHENPOST in German
Vol 37 No 10, 9 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Prof Lothar Bisky, rector of the GDR Film and Television College and member of the PDS party executive committee, by Sabine Herklotz; place and date not given: "Thoughtful New Beginning"]

[Text] [WOCHENPOST] The democratic transformation has generated many new parties in this country. The

PDS [Party of Democratic Socialism] now claims to be one of them. Considering the heavy legacy it inherited, is that not a very bold claim?

[Bisky] In view of our having formerly been the party controlling the state, which—by its administrative-bureaucratic policy—precipitated the country into a serious crisis, we are, and quite justly so, subject to more critical scrutiny than any other party. People are understandably skeptical as to whether we are in fact capable of renewal. Getting rid of Stalinism does not mean only the expulsion of members who abused their powers and were corrupt. Above all we need to liberate ourselves from dogmatism, and this has turned out to be a ballast which is hard to get rid of. It would be an illusion to believe that we can do so in three or four months.

In the past we tended to speak of *the* party. Now that we must deal with the past of this party, we note that it included a great variety of people. People who besmirched socialist ideals by claiming that they alone were always right, people who expected the party badge to help them in their careers. Other party members were dissident spirits, reviled as whiners and grumblers by the leadership, and who drew new courage from the democratic upheaval. Others yet were thrown into deep depression and resignation—ashamed of having too gullibly defended party policy. All of them, without any differentiation, are now encountering a huge wave of hatred.

Unfortunately this process cost us more than the members we would gladly have seen depart. In fact, nobody who is still a member of this party can possibly expect any benefits. Those who remain must instead expect to be attacked; will have to have courage. They are supported only by their convictions, their continued belief in socialist ideals. That lends strength to the party. And we are seeing that we can manage quite well without playing the "leading role." A party that used to claim to dominate the fate of the country and now defines its goals as a future opposition—it is bound to renew itself. This renewal, imposed on us by the man in the street, will continue.

[WOCHENPOST] In what way will this renewal become evident?

[Bisky] Entirely new executive boards are operating at all levels—in an honorary capacity, except for the chairmen and their deputies. In the case of kreis boards, this means two or three members. Nobody was able to forecast the makeup of these boards. The nomenclatura has been abolished. The only criteria were ideas, conviction, and the force of the respective personalities. Lately some delegate conferences were divided into working groups. Within an intimate circle it was possible to effectively propagate standpoints, to formulate motions to be submitted to the party conference for discussion by the plenum. In an intimate circle it was also possible for

members to get to know one another and confidently decide about candidates for delegates to the party congress and executive boards. As regards the executive boards, votes went largely to young people who had never been involved in the apparatus.

The renewal of the party is also demonstrated by its broad intellectual range: Communist, socialist, social democratic, and other platforms, working groups and initiatives for the establishment of working groups representing the special interests of young people and women (even the Left Christian Women) in the party.

[WOCHENPOST] Does not such a large variety make for a faceless party?

[Bisky] Let me ask you a counter question: Would it not be frightening for narrow intellectual limits to be immediately set by a party which dares to make a new start and is about to abolish Stalinism in politics, doctrine, organization and in the thoughts and actions of its members? We do not wish for either a class or a mass party and instead aim to provide a political home for as many left forces as possible. This is actually quite logical. The world situation, our national and international problems, require us to rank general human interests ahead of class interests. We are not concerned with the old formula—the fulfillment of the “historic mission of the working class”—but rather with the preservation of the earth, ambitious though this may sound.

[WOCHENPOST] Most parties have conducted their electoral campaigns against the PDS. Not one—not even in the left range—was willing to enter an electoral alliance. In this isolated position, the PDS is striving for a “muted” election campaign. How can you be confident that the voters will hear your voice among the din of noisy attacks?

[Bisky] We proclaimed a muted election campaign, because we neither can nor want to simply shrug off the history of our party. That history went hand in hand with many hollow, complacent, and arrogant phrases. We have every reason to be reticent and contemplative. Contemplation requires low key and thoughtful behavior. We wish to offer the voters our reflections and abandon the tradition of noisy slogans. We will abstain from large-scale demonstrations and instead seek to engage in intensive discussions with the voters—not trying to shout and take the other by surprise but make an effort at mutual understanding. At the first PDS Party Congress I actually noted that human warmth was once again suffusing the political discussion, that we were seeking a political language appealing to reason as well as to sentiment.

I think my party has a chance, provided that sober argument counts in the political discussion. I cannot imagine that a party would benefit in the long run, if it were to define itself at the expense of others. Maybe we should hope for normalcy to be restored to political relationships after the election, and that would include

opportunities for future alliances for us also. However, should politics abandon experience and reason, I would give up all my optimism.

[WOCHENPOST] The PDS also seems to consider German unity inevitable. Since it is unable to stop the process of unification, does it intend its slogan “pro GDR” to act as a brake?

[Bisky] Many people assume that we oppose German unity, because we, as a party, could not visualize survival in a united Germany. I think that, considering such a historic process, it does not matter whether a particular party survives. We should be concerned only with considering whether a 16-million strong people might be robbed of its dignity.

Evidently the desired speed of German unification indicates the difference in thinking. This is where the various election programs differ most widely. Only those, therefore, will vote for us, who strongly wish for an independent GDR within this process of unification. We intend to take their part by describing the consequences of an unconditional accession to the FRG. That is something unfortunately left undone by those who call for unconditional accession. What is going to happen if we simply take over the entire body of laws of the FRG? What will happen to private and social property, to the land, to enterprises, to housing? What is going to become of the right to work, the facilities for children, free education, free medical services? What is going to be left of such values as anti-Fascism and internationalism? Is it not illogical to accuse us of unsettling people by seeing and pointing out these dangers? Should we not expect relevant comments from those who now quietly accept cuts in social welfare and renounce sovereignty as the price to be paid for German unity?

[WOCHENPOST] In other words, your participation in the election campaign represents more than the mere wish for self-preservation. You are convinced that you will remain an influential political force even after the election?

[Bisky] We do not think that we are making a futile effort to provide a respectable political setting for the historical defeat of the SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany]. We and our membership continue to represent a force, we have many sympathizers and discussion partners in the entire range of the European left. By taking off the blinkers that used to narrow our vision to a socialism dressed “in GDR colors,” we are able to open ourselves without reservation to European left ideals. This will not weaken us. In this quite wide ranging spectrum we see ourselves as a definitely left party looking toward democratic socialism.

[WOCHENPOST] When the old SED leadership drew its image of GDR colored socialism, it had completely lost all sense of reality. Does not the goal of democratic socialism also feed illusions?

[Bisky] It seems to me one of the worst consequences of Stalinist socialism, that its breakdown is taken to make the possibility of a socialist future entirely illusionary. Many people cry: Never again socialism, no more experiments. Is not the precipitate unification of two very different systems another experiment, or at least an extremely bold enterprise? In fact, we consider democratic socialism to be primarily a social movement that not only seeks answers to national questions but also offers starting points for the solution of mankind's problems. So far, both systems have proven incapable of doing that—largely because they tried to achieve this goal in conflict with one another. We need a completely new developmental logic, calling on both systems to make a positive contribution. To such reflections we bring modern Marxist thought, cleansed of dogmatism. However strong political pragmatism may be, we need to preserve room for visions.

HUNGARY

Police Brutality, Surveillance Reportedly Still Used Against Opposition

90CH0038A Budapest SZENT KORONA in Hungarian
21 Feb 90 p 11

[Article by Laszlo Almasy: "Notebook"]

[Text] Record. I the undersigned, Laszlo Almasy (Pilisvorosvar, Artur Gorgey Street 55), born 30 December, 1942, state the following:

The police took pictures of us on 1 February 1990, when we marched to the television building. On the following day, in the course of a police raid at the Western Railroad terminal underpass, they took notes on my data, and presented a picture which showed several of us from among the demonstrators. Then they asked me where these people were demonstrating and whether I knew them. When I responded by saying that I had seen them but I did not know their names, they instructed me to pack up the "gutter papers" and leave, and that we would meet again at police headquarters.

Thereafter I departed for home, but I had an incident before that; two policemen using their service vehicle tried to run me down on the sidewalk (at Pilisvorosvar, near my home). I jumped to the side and they ran into a tree. The uniformed policeman got out of the car and began searching his pocket; he cursed me in vulgar terms, but I escaped into the darkness. (This took place on Friday.) I worked on Saturday, but after the raid I went home and at about 2300 hours the policemen appeared with an order to present me. They did not give a reason for the order—I would find out at police headquarters. They took me to the Budapest fifth district police headquarters. There they presented me to a person dressed in civilian clothing. He introduced himself as the organizing secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP]. He agitated for two and a half hours, asking what I was doing with this "mob gang," why I was

demonstrating with them, why I would not rejoin the MSZP, because if I did I would receive a basic pension of 11,500 forints and a stand where I could sell the best selling books and the most sought after newspapers. Within a year I could become a millionaire because I would not even have to pay taxes, the MSZP organization would take care of me.

I rejected this offer by saying that I was not a trashy turncoat, robber mafioso as they were, who had done nothing for 43 years but rob, extort, and plunder the people. I stick to my faith and conviction. I know that the entire MSZP is a rat pushed into a corner, which is launching a last desperate attack. The MSZP no longer has an existential right in this country, or a chance to continue doing what it did in this country for 43 years.

They threatened me in response, saying that I should not curse them, because they would strike me on the nose so hard that I would fall through the wall. I responded by saying that I would strike back so that the entire police headquarters would be wiped out. They continued with their arguments; they did not permit me to light up a cigarette, moreover, when I asked for a glass of water to take my medicine (Nitromin retard, Trazikor) they also denied me that. A high ranking officer entered (all I know is that he had a high rank; due to my nervous condition and ill feeling I could not determine his rank). He came to my defense and held my examiner to account; he asked on what basis I was brought in and who had signed the order to present me. But they were unable to find all of this out because the signature was illegible. Thereafter they prepared a record, because I was filing a complaint against an unknown person. The police officer apologized for the incident. I wish to note here that at the same time, for similar reasons, several persons were with me at police headquarters. I met those persons later.

We wanted to work on Sunday—all day—but this did not happen because of the police raid and the persecution. We were concerned that they would take us in once again, together with my associates, the way they had promised.

(I would like to note here that I saw very many pictures of demonstrators, and the officer promised that all the pictures would be destroyed and that he would see to it that the persecution and this kind of police action would cease, so that we could sell our newspapers without problems. There has been no police harassment since that time!)

On Sunday I returned home tired from work. I arrived at my home at about 2300 hours. The following circumstances awaited me: The door and the window were broken into, everything in the apartment was turned upside-down, and money and various documents pertaining to my person were removed. I heard voices even before I could collect myself after this shock. I stepped out the door to find out who was there. In that moment I was struck so hard that I lost consciousness. When I

regained consciousness I found myself in the apartment; I was unable to sleep all night from pain and fear, because the apartment could not be locked as a result of the break-in.

On Monday and Tuesday I labored on repairing the apartment; I was unable to work.

On the evening of 13 February 1990 we went to the Szlovak beer hall (in Ignac Nagy Street) to find one of my colleagues. My female colleague went in to settle her accounts; I stayed outside the door. My colleague had barely entered the door when a black Volga car stopped suddenly in front of me. Three men jumped out of the car, grabbed my shoulder, turned me around, and hit my stomach with their elbows so that I twitched from pain. Thereafter they struck the back of my neck so that I lost consciousness. They shoved me into the car. I regained consciousness in a cellar filled with various posters and signs of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF]. I asked the people there why all of this had happened. They told me that "soon all of you will die. What do you want, a government? You rotten fascists! Dirty bourgeois gang! There will be no capitalism in Hungary!" To this I responded that "I may be dead, but it is also all over for you!"

I asked where I was. I was told that I was at No. 11 Bela Bartok Street (11th District). (I confirmed this when they put me out on the sidewalk. I recognized the place from the Meszoly beer hall on the corner.)

About 20 minutes later the black Volga reappeared again; a huge man and a young lady stepped out of it. I asked her to bring me water because I was supposed to take my medicines. The lady was nice and readily complied with my request, and I was able to take my medicines at last. Thereafter they put me in the car and quickly departed from the scene. At Boraros Square the car slowed down. The lady realized that I was feeling bad. They apologized for what had taken place and had only this to say: "The entire incident was an error." They were very sorry. They took me home to Pilisvorosvar, and let me out at the railroad crossing. They turned around in front of the Sport restaurant and drove away in the direction of Budapest at high speed.

* * *

This note was handwritten on 14 February 1990 in room No. 16 of the Jurta Theater, in the handwriting of Sandor Szentgaly. We completed the record which consists of eight pages at 1730 hours.

* * *

I verify the authenticity of the record with my own signature.

POLAND

Left Wing Parties: Credibility, Assets, Publications, Coalitions

90EP0430A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
15 Mar 90 pp 1, 5

[Article by Wojciech Krawczyk and Maciej Urbaniak: "Report on the Left"]

[Text] Today what and who can be tagged as "left wing" on the basis of easily measurable criteria? Should the left wing label be assigned exclusively to those who declare themselves "left wing" or should the label also be used for those whose actions fit within the compass of attitudes and concepts classically recognized as leftist? In preparing this article, we neither wished to promote anyone or (through hasty classification) to humiliate anyone. We likewise attempted to apply Marx's statement that "man is that which he becomes." However, a definite problem in research order held us back, namely that of determining whether the person under consideration has a clean record.

Our report would be incomplete if we had neglected the enormous number of former members of the "leading force" who, being disinclined toward political activity (at least for the present), remain people without a party as far as program is concerned. How many of them really accept the definition of leftist ideals that is classically promoted? How many of them will desire to join actively in the current of political life in the future?

And so many heroes of our article deceive by using names which fall short of their views, activities and the facts, creating ridiculous divisions.

New groups are rising up out of the PZPR, so recently laid to rest. They are accompanied by no fanfare, but by the cries of "down with the commune" and police whistles. For the most part, these groups are composed of old comrades. It is difficult at present to assess their real power and influence and it is even more difficult to evaluate their programs, replaced, for the moment, by declarations of intent. How will they differ from their predecessors (except for the obvious fact that they no longer control the government)? What are their goals and aims right now? for the future? What values do they intend to defend and for whom do they wish to gain society's support? The distinguishing mark of the left at present is merely a substitute label to facilitate their finding a place in today's Polish political landscape. Tomorrow the content will have to be filled in.

Moreover, the majority of groups in our political panopticon are short of breath. They lack a broad perspective and the kind of long-range vision that are needed to hasten the flow of history. And so we share the view of Adam Michnik that many Poles are taking part in a masquerade party, for the programs and declarations of various groups do not reflect their real interests, plans and aspirations. This confirms the likelihood of the idea

of a general party crisis and of a crisis of leftist parties—operating in democratic societies—in particular.

Only the social movements which have been stripped of their bureaucracy and are being formed to meet immediate tasks and future dangers have credibility, movements which are giving birth to new traditions and which are bringing together activists with a complex identity, social democratic Christian Democrats, national-Christian socialists, conservatives going liberal, Catholic liberals and, finally, reformist radicals. These directions are just taking shape. They are seeking a precise definition for the identity they sense within themselves, an identity which will be labeled in one way or another, regardless of its affinity with the above labels.

We believe that after these structures have crystallized, the right-left opposition will take on its proper significance, in relationship to reality. But by then this will be a new left and a new right, for the conflicts between the Poles and the challenges which face them are new ones and will be new ones in the future.

A Question of Credibility

The members of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] are in large part members of the former ruling authority linked with the PZPR. The party is forming according to a unique procedure, from the establishment of ruling authorities who are trying to add to their supporters and gather them together in primary organizations known as circles.

Aleksander Kwasniewski, former member of the ruling establishment and roundtable animator, currently chairman of the SdRP RN [National Council], does not divorce himself from the PZPR but maintains that he does not wish to falsify his biography and create himself like a Konrad Wallenrod. Nor do I wish to cancel out the entire history of the party of which I was a member (unlike T. Fiszbach), at the same time believing that, like many of Fiszbach's contemporaries, I too was a hidden social democrat from the dawn of my political work. The leader maintains that it is the new party's style and program that are repelling the followers of the former party "concrete" and not the decisive veto of reformers. Should we not take as an admonition the famous opinion of the Hungarian Stalinist Matyas Rakosi, who defined his attitude to coalition partners when he said: "One must know that our strategy is complex. We are allies; at the same time we must aim to liquidate allies. Does a man do something while at the same time doing something that is directly contrary to what he is doing?"

The SdRP numbers an estimated 47,000 members. At least five persons are required to form a circle. Besides councils and boards, both gmina and municipal, which have authority to pass resolutions, there are executive committees and their secretaries. At the voivodship level there are initiatives groups composed primarily of the founders of parties. Their decisions bind the lower structures (although not always and not everywhere,

since the lack of voivodship registers makes this impossible at the present time). Dues are voluntary and total from 5,000 to 10,000 zlotys. Some voivodship organizations have already opened accounts in anticipation of donations.

It seems that the SdRP does not have the vigor and dynamism of the young parties and that in the field it is trying to hide rather than to act openly. The manner of recruitment, which resembles the arduous amassing of former PZPR members rather than open agitation, supports this notion.

At an assembly-congress involving diverse elements held in a Warsaw PKiN [Palace of Culture and Learning] auditorium, the Social Democratic Union's [Usd] founding group, numbering approximately 140 persons, was created. It included 31 deputies from the PKLD [Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left]. In addition to the leader, T. Fiszbach, we find in this group: Prof. Jozef Kaleta, Prof. Jerzy Kolodziejski, government minister, Prof. Janusz Letowski, formerly not affiliated with any party, Prof. Jack Wodz, Andrzej Bratkowski, Krzysztof Komornicki, Marek Krol and... Roman Ney.

The name of this new organization reflects its formula. It is to be a union of many local social democratic groups. Each of the founders is to create such a local organization within his community. It is envisaged that these local parties will have their own programs and autonomous organizational structures. The founding congress (to be held most likely at the beginning of April 1990) will close the preliminary phase of formation of the union which, in the opinion of its founders, is to be characterized more as a social movement than a typical political party.

Social credibility is the most important factor for the union's founders. They consider the idea of the indispensable unity of the left to be post-Leninist.

The "unici" (this name has become generally accepted in the Warsaw political community) estimate the number of active sympathizers to be several thousand (given the lack of a formal makeup we cannot speak of members as such). In addition to the Usd Deputies' Circle, the most active communities are the following: Slask-Dabrowo, Wielkopolska, Gdansk, Warsaw and Radom.

The union is open to discussion with the PPS, valuing the "socialists" who, in recent years, have inscribed a beautiful page in the history of the democratic left. This cooperation is necessary for the union. On the other hand, for the present it is not interested in cooperation with the SdRP—it is a question of credibility.

Facts, Numbers, Sentiments

The PPS revived its activity in November 1987 during a congress which lasted three rounds, with complications. The SB [Security Service] broke it off forcibly.

The party, which numbers approximately 1,000 members, has a territorial structure. One belongs to it at one's place of residence or place of work. In order to join, one must be recommended by two PPS members. According to Andrzej Malanowski, secretary of the PPS Supreme Council, the party does not intend to abandon this requirement, since it depends upon securing itself "against the obliteration of the PPS nucleus in the mass of former members of the former PZPR".

It is divided into districts and, within the districts, into circles. Likewise, there are a certain number of circles which do not belong to any district and are subject directly to the central authorities. The districts basically coincide with the division into voivodships, but not everywhere. If the number of members in a given voivodship is small, only circles are created. However, there are likewise smaller towns (e.g., Walcz and Mlawa), each of which has several circles. This has made possible the creation of separate districts in these places.

The highest party authority is the congress. According to the statute, it is called once every 2 years. The PPS congress was held on 15-16 April 1989 in Lesna Podkowa. It appointed a Supreme Council [RN] of over 20 persons. The district representatives take part in the work of the RN. The five-person RN Presidium directs ongoing work and the Central Executive Committee runs organizational matters.

A. Malanowski explains: "We are using the name PPS out of sentiment, for this is an outfit which says something to Poles, which is associated historically with the presidents of the RP [Polish Republic], with Pilsudski, with the participation in the war of 1920 and also with the workers battalions in the defense of Warsaw."

The merger of the democratic left is a PPS idea. In the opinion of Senator Jan Jozef Lipski, party chairman, a leftist character is exhibited by the PPS Provisional National Commission, which is directed by Grzegorz Ilka and by the "Reform and Democracy" Club. But to an even greater extent, however, many of the activists of Solidarity and the citizens committees may be considered to be leftist. For the present, however, they are not trying—like Bronislaw Geremek or Adam Michnik—to create an independent party. Within the announced OKP [Citizens Parliamentary Club] framework, the Group in Defense of Employee Interests, which numbers about 30 deputies and senators at present, should be recognized as a parliamentary emanation of the left. Some of these deputies and senators include: Zofia Kuratowska, Karol Modzelewski, Zbigniew Romaszewski, Ryszard Bugaj, Grazyna Staniszevska, Aleksander Malachowski and three PPS members—Kazimierz Blaszczyk, Marian Kowal and J.J. Lipski.

The PPS leadership believes that serious program differences exist between its party and the PPS-Democratic Revolution. The PPS says that as a social democratic

party of the reformist type it is an adherent of evolutionary, and not revolutionary, changes in Poland. The PPS-RD, on the other hand, aspires toward sudden change.

At present the PPS-RD numbers about 500 members. According to Piotr Ikonowicz, the number of its sympathizers is much larger than this. The PPS-RD is trying to cooperate closely with many sympathetic Solidarity plant organizations and with the self-government movement. The circulation of its publications is the best evidence of its activism.

At one time the adherents of violent protest were a recognized group, but today one and all divorce themselves from such protest, recognizing it to be an absurd type of behavior. In the opinion of P. Ikonowicz, they are clear evidence of the frustration of youth, but nothing much comes from them. Of course, one may protest in the streets—it is appropriate and sometimes necessary. But such manifestations and protests must be really peaceful ones.

The PPS-RD plans to be placed on the ballot of self-government elections. Aware of the realities, it wishes to enter into an alliance with local groups of ecologists, members of local self-governments, unionists disenchanted with Solidarity wearing the citizens committee hat.

The left wing is also represented by the Polish Social Democratic Party set in motion by Juliusz Garstecki and Czeslaw Seniuch. It is difficult to make any concrete statements about the influence of this organization or about the range of influence of the Boleslaw Limanowski Center-Left Club which arose recently in Warsaw.

Quarrels Over Property

The material situation of leftist parties is unstable. Most make use of one or several small rooms and have no vehicles, no telephones and no potted palms in the offices of leaders. Only the SdRP has all of this in abundance. This is a still-warm PZPR legacy that burns our fingers today.

At the end of last year, the PZPR made use of 436 different buildings. However, according to TRYBUNA LUDU, only 16 of them were the full property of the party. More than half of them (224) were built with state monies and on state lands. Another 171 also arose on land belonging to the state treasury, but were built out of party funds (and a large portion of these, although not the majority, were subsidized or were funded out of compulsory taxation of working people, as in the case of the CC building). These buildings should return to their owners and they are already returning to them, although this process is not yet moving as fast as it should be. The rest are facilities whose use is based on rental and leasing agreements and the like.

Another legacy is personal property. The news from the field is that there have been massive sales of this property of late. And today no one really knows how much "rolling automobile stock" the SdRP still has in its possession (at the end of the year the figure was 1,173).

The SdRP claims that it took over the PZPR's property because somebody had to do this, because it wants to cooperate loyally with the government commission and in general because the debts of the defunct PZPR exceed the value of its assets. The SdRP wants to pay them and to divide what is left with the other leftist groups. What remains above all is the RSW [Worker's Cooperative Publishing House] "cooperative," in which the PZPR held as much as 95 percent of the shares.

The PPS [Polish Socialist Party], above all, is interested in this distribution. It draws its moral right from history. To be sure, the PZPR's strength in terms of property was built initially on the property it took over from the PPS. The talks are going on. The PPS's first move would be to obtain EXPRESS WIECZORNY and the printing firm, as well as the premises that once belonged to this party. For those premises which do not exist others should be assumed. But the PPS demands are also directed toward the state. Many of the assets it held directly following World War II are nationalized today. Perhaps the most important of these are the 11 nationalized printing establishments and buildings, e.g., the one that housed the PPS CC on Wiejska Street.

T. Fiszbach's union, on the other hand, does not want the encumbrances of the past. The creators of the union consider PZPR property to be such an encumbrance. TRYBUNA put it succinctly: "Fiszbach will take what he needs from the government."

Publications

Formally, the sole organ of the SdRP is TRYBUNA (formerly TRYBUNA KONGRESOWA and before that TRYBUNA LUDU). Nonetheless, in addition to many other elements of PZPR property, the new party has also inherited a number of publications. This is an inheritance jure caduco—by virtue of old PZPR structures and connections which have been revitalized through sympathy with or membership in the SdRP. Some party and so-called reader-based dailies and voivodship weeklies subordinated until recently to the RSW are declining and some are being taken over by citizens committees which sometimes change their names, "localize" them and print up their autonomy in vignettes. There are also changes in format and in the stylistics of statements—GAZETA WYBORCZA is being imitated the most closely in this regard. A fundamental problem of these papers is the credibility of their leaders and some authors, as well as the glaring disproportion between the multitude of titles which opt for social democracy and the number of SdRP members and, more importantly, society's real support for this political direction.

In spite of cosmetic practices, and if only because of the increase in the prices of press publications, the circulation of dailies and publications of the former PZPR is declining. Thus, their until recently available leadership has been trying—with various results—to establish contacts with regional Solidarity structures and citizens committees and to publish materials about them, or they take the alternative path of linking up with SdRP circles. Finally, a third route exists—continuing in the network of past politico-societal ties and defending the bastions of nomenklatura: until recently committees, cooperative unions and companies, at present incompetent voivodship governors and the official cadre, militia and SB structures and their compromised representatives. The mood among the journalists who write for these publications varies: some like the SdRP union for, they say, they have always been integral social democrats; many oppose it, but they wish to be kept on editorial staffs, others are indifferent or submit their offerings to the independent press (although it is difficult to get a job there) and, finally there is a formidable group which, out of a sense of defeat and bankruptcy, plans to leave the profession.

The central organ of the PPS is ROBOTNIK which comes out every 2 weeks as a rule in a circulation of about 3,000 copies. Like the other PPS publications, it is a second cycle publication. NAPRZOD appears irregularly in Krakow and ROBOTNIK POMORZA ZACHODNIEGO in Szczecin. Beyond this, theoretical brochures are published by the WIEDZA publishing house or signed by ROBOTNIK. Renski's work "Skradzione sztandary" [Stolen Standards], which traces the breakup of the PPS in the 1940's, is in preparation.

GAZETA WSPOLNA is an occasional USD publication. The first issue, put out by the USD Deputies' Circle, appeared in February 1990. The Poznan weekly WPROST, whose editor in chief Marek Krol (former secretary of the PZPR CC) is one of the founders of the union, also made its columns available to the group.

The question of ideological ties with the socialist and social-democratic thinking of GAZETA WYBORCZA, PO PROSTU and POLITYKA remains an open one. While they are not really official publications of any of the current parties, the attitudes they hold and the values and kind of social sensitivity they express suggest that these ties are close. The PPS-RD conducts very lively publishing activity. The central publication of this party carries a title identical to the PPS publication ROBOTNIK. Like its namesake, it is a second cycle publication. However, its circulation is larger. Given the conditions of underground production, it is truly impressive, coming out in 20,000 copies on the average. It appears relatively regularly every 2 weeks. The PPS-RD Employees' Division also publishes the monthly PRACA, PLACA, BHP [occupational health and safety] in 10,000 copies. Moreover, districts and certain plant organizations publish their own publications in small quantities. ROBOTNIK BIALOSTOCKI, e.g., has a circulation of 2,000-3,000.

Producing a Partner for the OKP

At present, there are 166 deputies in the Parliamentary Club of the Democratic Left. Despite the storms in the "left wing", the club has sustained relatively few losses since the beginning of the term. To date, only seven persons have left its ranks, and it continues to be the most numerous club in the Sejm. The trashing of the PZPR politically led to a division among deputies of the left. Thirty-four opened the USd Deputies' Circle within the framework of the club, while 20 joined the SdRP. But these figures are variable and they are subject to change on an almost daily basis. For the present, the majority have remained without party affiliation—some due to already existing or anticipated legal regulations (judges, the military, MO officers), others, such as Minister Marcin Swiecicki, e.g., carrying out a program and the rest lying in wait for the development of events.

The club is an important element of the political landscape in the Sejm. One hundred sixty-six unanimous votes can tip the balance of practically any vote. The question is: will they be unanimous?

For the present, the situation is complex. The union circle has already announced its departure, but it is not yet known when this decision will take effect. It may happen at the next Sejm meeting (22-23 March) or right after the union founding congress planned for the first half of April. Possibly, it will not occur at all, especially if the club agrees to pay the price in the form of a leadership office in exchange for unity. This is especially the case since it does not seem that substantive divisions will occur in the parliamentary left. In the end, the head of the program commission at the PZPR farewell congress was union leader T. Fiszbach. As S. Wiatr observed, only the form of organization of the deputies divides them.

The situation in parliament also compels unity. I heard from the PKLD deputies that if there are more attacks such as the one delivered recently by deputy Lopszanski, it will be difficult to drive any sort of wedge between us.

The club is changing its code of regulations. The new one is to accept the existing organizational divisions. It will probably also change its chairman. M. Orzechowski has already tendered his resignation considering that he was recommended for this position by the nonexistent Politburo of a no longer existing party. At the present time no one knows who the new leader will be. The least talk is given over to personal data. I heard two views on this matter. One is that it must be someone for the largest group—those without any party affiliation. One hears the name of Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz in this context. The second view is that organizational affiliation is not important. The chairman must simply be a partner for OKP head Bronisław Geremek and he must know how to integrate the club around himself, how to rise above organizational divisions.

The club has supported the government of T. Mazowiecki and it plans to continue to do so. It intends to

cooperate loyally with all parliamentary forces, although for many reasons it does not look like there will be any sort of more formal coalitions. Perhaps the departure of the PZPR will facilitate the process of reaching understanding in the Sejm, the process of "grinding out a consensus."

YUGOSLAVIA

Judge Proposes Dissolution of Court's Party Organizations

90BA0020B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
6 Mar 90 pp 26-27

[Article and interview with Zagreb Municipal Court Judge Ranko Marjan, by Zorica Nikolic, place and date not given: "Court Freed From the Party: How To Achieve the World Standard for Judicial Independence"]

[Text] Recently (at the session of 21 February), the Presidency of the Central Committee [CC] of the League of Communists of Croatia [LCC] passed a resolution on the appointment of a Commission for Organizational-Political Transformation of the League of Communists of Croatia, which would have to present to the Presidency a new plan for the organization of the party by the end of May. The primary task set out by the Presidency for itself—bearing in mind the unbending commitment of the CC LCC to the idea that at this time questions of organization and forms of activity need not be the primary focus in the basic organizations of the League of Communists and the organs of the LC—is "elections and victory in them." Specifically, the position is that in the next few months, the existing basic forms of organization must be maintained in enterprises and institutions, and that on this basis preparations for a fundamental reorganization of the party should be conducted.

Specifically, it is known that organizational changes in the League of Communists are inevitable, regardless of the outcome of the elections, and that this relates first and foremost to the state organs, and within them in turn primarily to the judiciary and the organs of domestic affairs, as the first step in divorcing the state and the party and depoliticizing the judiciary. However, some have accelerated the process and have already disbanded their party organizations. For example, the first one in this "branch" has been abolished, the party organization of Zagreb District Court. Now, judges will gather up their connections, but where they will go with them is something that "only the good Lord knows" for now. At the Zagreb district attorney's office, the matter was a little more complicated. On the eve of the recent (regular) meeting of the Basic Organization of the LC, an initiative was received to the effect that the dissolution of the party organization be placed on the agenda. A controversy developed—was this not overly hasty, and was this not a specific kind of "coup d'etat" in the district attorney's office? However, nearly everyone was of the opinion that the party no longer has a place in the

district attorney's office, adding emphatically that, after all, the party had no influence on their work. But opinions varied about whether the break with the party should be done immediately, or when and how. Some advocated "throwing out" the party immediately, but after an (open) vote, this initiative was not adopted. Only the secretary indignantly threw away his party card.

The situation in other judicial offices in Croatia was one of wandering, with calls for resolutions and instructions. Thus, lately there has been a continuation of correspondence on the relationship between basic organizations of the LC and the municipal committees of the LC, and definitive instructions are expected from the republican party Presidency. Specifically, at the aforementioned meeting, the Presidency of the CC LCC adopted the position that the creation and development of new forms of association and activity in every concrete environment must be stimulated, but with one "but": "in such a way that the position on any potential demand for changes in the organization be adopted by the municipal committee of the LCC, with prior consultation with the Presidency of the CC LCC, in order to ensure that the transition to new forms of activity not be carried out in an unbridled fashion and with damage to our electoral activities." It is in this sense that the newly-created Commission will act: It will propose to the Presidency positions on questions with which it will be confronted.

This was our motivation for speaking with Judge Ranko Marjan, vice president of Zagreb Municipal Court, who provided the initiative for the dissolution of the Court's party organization.

In accepting market competition, the freedom of association and of the circulation of capital, private initiative, and the noninterference of the state in economic processes, it is also necessary to accept the depoliticization of the judiciary and the establishment of the rule-of-law state. Thus, there is nothing more logical than our position that the court must be freed of the party presence, which is what we have done, says Marjan.

Naturally, the withdrawal of the basic organizations of the LC from the court does not constitute the decisive step in depoliticizing the judiciary. It is only one small act in a series of endeavors by those of us aspiring to turn the current situation of the judiciary into the modern model of the rule-of-law state.

The political convictions and party affiliation of a judge should be his personal business, and respecting this individuality has no place in the work environment, in state organs, and especially not in the court. This is the logic of the multiparty system, the only possible way of operating in pluralism. No one has a right any longer to investigate the political suitability of judges, nor can judges in the course of their functions be swayed by partisan considerations, just as their rulings cannot be colored by this or that political view. The only political stand in this difficult and accountable profession is that of adherence to positive, legal, procedural and material precepts. In my court, it would be necessary to tolerate mere membership in a party, but whether all forms

of political activity by judges will be allowed or whether they will be restricted or even prohibited is a question that is urgently in need of regulation by law.

If we suppose that the "rule-of-law state" is a system in which the rule of law exists, then this means that in such a state the laws are both just and equitable and that the laws are respected by those who adopt them, those who apply them, and a majority of those to whom they are applied. Thus, a state in which all instruments for effecting and defending the law are systematically, clearly, and effectively standardized by law. Unfortunately, we live in a time and place of regulatory inflation, under conditions of hyper-standardization, which means poor standardization and the deafening roar of laws, statutes, and decrees, full of poorly defined concepts, which is also one of the reasons for the legal uncertainty of citizens and for the inefficiency of the judicial apparatus. After all, for years the judiciary has been pointing out the inadequate ordinances, the inefficient, uneconomical, and inequitable rulings prescribed by law, but all of these proposals and suggestions have been like dead letters.

[Nikolic] What exactly is depoliticization of the judiciary, and what is the connection between a constitutional proclamation about judicial independence in principle and everyday practice?

[Marjan] Depoliticization of the judiciary is the realization of the so deeply desired, full judicial independence. And need I say that in our state system there still exist selection mechanisms with which judicial independence—which is otherwise prescribed by law—can be attacked?! The existence of reappointment, that constitutional category whose rationale, besides providing a tactful way to fire people, is something that we could not call honorable, at any rate weakens the position of the judge in relation to those who will decide about his reappointment. Because if he is not reappointed, then he is unemployed and on the street without any explanation whatsoever. As if we are not dealing with a professional and as if law is not a profession to which many of us have devoted ourselves, thinking it to be for our entire life. The reappointment, selection, and acquittal of the municipal upholders of the judicial function are in the hands of the corresponding municipal assembly, as are the finances of these judicial organs. And this means that the judiciary must wrestle with daily political pragmatism and resist the petty political interests of the local centers of power. We work under conditions of a depressing and discouraging material situation for the judiciary, with inadequate and outdated equipment. We are shadowed by a constant fluctuation in staff in the courts and elsewhere, by the lengthiness of the appointment procedures, by the absence of a meaningful, long-term personnel policy, by a murderous load in terms of the number of documents being worked on, and—despite exceptional individual results in qualitative and quantitative terms—by an accumulated backlog that simply cannot be fixed by anyone. And sluggish and inefficient justice becomes its own negation.

Despite all this, and perhaps because of it, the judiciary is inundated with mostly professional people, enthusiastic about and in love with this difficult and responsible work. They attend to their numerous subjects diligently, in anonymity and in the silence of mountains of documents, statements, and legal and factual entanglements.

It is all the more sorrowful, uproarious, and indecent that occasional trials resound like the consequences of the political servility and bureaucratic routine of judges. By demystifying these taboos, we strengthen the culture of defending human rights, and we put an end to the calculations and mystifications to the effect that law is a social instrument that some avant garde uses whenever and however it pleases. The idea of judicial independence must be developed not only as a legal and political category, but also as an achievement of civilization. But it is difficult to effect this completely under electrified circumstances, when for example a leader makes a public promise about an arrest, and then keeps that promise, or when others applaud a mass of people that is seeking arms against another people. When congresses and parliamentary sessions constitute a gruesome parade of kitsch, aggressiveness, ultimatums, and stupidity.

[Nikolic] It is difficult right here and now to avoid asking you what you think about political trials and whether you even acknowledge their existence.

[Marjan] We have had them, and we probably still do. Villasi comes to mind, but since I deeply respect the principle of sub judice I won't discuss that.

The existence of political trials should come as no surprise as long as the Penal Code recognizes an abundance of political, but imprecise legal concepts and definitions. For example, from the point of view of criminal law what exactly is the meaning of counterrevolution, rule of the working class, fraternity and unity (Art. 114, Penal Code of the SFRY), socialist self-management relations, or malicious and false representation of sociopolitical conditions in the country (Art. 133, Penal Code of the SFRY)?! These political concepts are so ill-defined and subject to so many different interpretations, depending on the time, the place, and of course the interpreter, that they simply do not satisfy the minimum civilized legal standards. Such "legal institutes" cause only genuine legal uncertainty and actual disparity among the citizenry, with variegated possibilities for abuse by state organs. Just think about how the term counterrevolution will be interpreted by a court in, say, Titova Mitrovica and by one in, say, Titovo Velenje!

Or, what was "malicious or false representation of the sociopolitical conditions in the country" or what constituted the legal characteristic of the criminal act of enemy propaganda yesterday, and what is it today, and what does this mean in one part of the country and what in another part?

Formulated in this way, the articles are fertile ground for a flourishing of political trials, and they are a negation of the rule-of-law state. But there have also been and will always be trials that some will call political for this or that reason. In contrast to a professional answer to the

professional question of whether and according to what ordinances proceedings are initiated, and whether the legal standard has been properly applied to the fully and correctly established facts of the case, there will also be malicious manipulation through impressions, calculating maneuvers, and mystifications.

[Nikolic] If we are in favor of a rule-of-law state, then we are in favor of having contestable, legally relevant facts established only by a professional, stable, and independent judicial apparatus, within the framework of proceedings prescribed by law, not established on the street or at political forums.

[Marjan] The judiciary has been yelling about all that for too long already, making every effort for the state system to lift, in a constitutionally defined way, the anchor of bad ordinances and irresponsible decisions in order to get out of these perilously rising waters and reach the shore of European civilized achievements, which I believe we have earned and which have been our due for a long time.

As a preparation for changes, which would have to be enacted into law this year, the entire judiciary of the republic would have to be financed through the Assembly, which would both select and dismiss all the holders of judicial functions. In addition, reappointment is foreseen in a fundamentally more flexible manner. This tells us that the shore to which we aspire, even though enshrouded in fog, is not that far away. It must be definitely understood that the judiciary is a service for the free citizenry, for each unique individual human being who asks the state to sit in judgment upon him in concrete proceedings, bound only by the law and its conscience. Since an independent judge can exist only in an independent judiciary, the right to an independent judge should be given broad significance—the significance of an elemental political right of the citizen to such an organization of political rule, within the framework of which the court can perform its function independently. That is the essence of depoliticization.

We must bravely follow the road of existing worldwide standards for judicial independence and designated mechanisms for defending it. To be sure, the road will not be an easy one, but there is no progress without a willingness to make sacrifices.

Church Declines To Support Croatian Political Parties

*90BA0020A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian
6 Mar 90 pp 18-19*

[Article by Marinko Culic: "Chapter Remains in Church: Church Thus Far Succeeds in Resisting Attempts To Involve It in Partisan Pluralism"]

[Text] The fact that the partisan campaign for April's elections in Croatia will be "hand-to-hand" combat not only for each registered voter, but also for those who, due to a concurrence of events, are not participating in the elections, was evidenced first of all when the Croatian Fraternal Union sent a message to the parties in the

homeland telling them not to count on that organization to endorse and commit itself to a party. Shortly thereafter, another institution was forced to do a similar thing, one with explicit political influence in the country but a reluctance to commit itself openly, no matter how much the hungry parties would like the votes. In its latest issue, GLAS KONCILA printed a denial—undoubtedly crafted at the highest ecclesiastical level—in which it is stated that Cardinal Franjo Kuharic did not send a greeting to the congress of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community], but rather “politely declined” an invitation to attend the congress, which had been sent to him by Dr. Franjo Tudman. GLAS KONCILA interprets the cardinal’s position on the basis of the Church’s attitude in principle of not “taking sides for any party, but rather urging believers to become involved in political life freely, responsibly, and on their own behalf.” That is also why, it is maintained, the cardinal received a group of Croatian emigres not as representatives of the HDZ, but rather as “believers and compatriots,” to whom hospitality was due from their travels around the world. The publication does not explain how it was that several leaders of the “Union” were also present at that meeting (Tudman, Jurica...), and there is only passing reference to the part—for the Church the most controversial—of the two-day mass scene in Lisinski—about the election of priest Ante Bakovic (known from the affair surrounding the gathering of donations in Austria, later retired for “reasons of health”) to the inner leadership circle of the HDZ, and about the partisan involvement of Franciscan Tomislav Pavel Duka and priest Franjo Cuk. The Catholic weekly only says that the priests and monks who participated in the work of the congress were not there as representatives of the Church, but rather as citizens “on their own responsibility,” not clarifying what kind of responsibility (moral?) they might be talking about. More complete information to the reader would be that the partisan involvement of Church figures is expressly prohibited by the codex of canon law and by the papal decree *Episcopi Quidam*, which has already been applied to us in one case (the ban on membership in the theological society Christianity Today), although the “sin” committed in that case (membership in the SAWP [Socialist Alliance of Working People]) certainly does not approximate this one.

Signs of Caution

But despite this understatement, the hasty reaction by the Church leadership bears witness to how the two-day congress of the HDZ, with occasional euphoric outpourings of fidelity towards the Catholic faith and Church, was perceived at the Chapter not as a chance episode, but rather as a serious sign that not even the Church will be able to escape partisan duelling and that some parties will certainly try to win it over to their side in these duels. Already on several occasions, every appearance of Church support for any party whatsoever has been rejected by the Chapter, but it appears that after the unpleasantness with the HDZ the Church leadership

decided to go one step further—to reject the notion of any sort of “natural alliance” with parties that, more than others, raise the national flag or present themselves as the most committed defenders of the Catholic faith. An unusually brusque commentary by GLAS KONCILA, published in the same issue as the aforementioned denial, states that the Church leadership, even at the price of being perceived as “divorced from the people, pragmatic, the willing or unwilling ally of the already-thwarted regime,” will not show partiality towards any political organization, with special emphasis on the unacceptability of those political orientations that are preoccupied with “excessive nationalism.” At the very outset of the text, printed under an almost votive headline (“The Church Will Not Be Manipulated”), the possible criticism of the Church as the brakeman to the “Croatian awakening” is rejected, saying explicitly that the Church will not abandon its “Catholic sobriety” and allow itself to be drawn into the “fervor,” not even at this moment in Croatian history, when “the nation finally appears to be starting to breathe.”

All in all, the basic points stressed in this article indicate that the Church is beginning to quickly interpret not only the global, but also the everyday “signs of the times,” with more willingness than it has shown in the past to adapt to the changes as fast as they emerge. Thus, just the prior issue of the same publication published a commentary on the need for “national reconciliation,” which can always be defended from the point of view of the basic message—the equality of citizens “of all convictions and all opinions about the present and the past”—but which after the latest events in Lisinski that same editorial staff would probably rather “skip over.” To be fair, it should be said that the timing for the thesis on “national reconciliation” does not appear to be well-chosen, for one reason. Every “reconciliation” involves a little “ironing out” of differences, or that which in present-day dictionaries would be called homogenization, and that is difficult to square with these “pluralistic” times, to which the Church too is lending its full support, opposing only the founding of special “Christian parties.”

This type of variation and oscillation between these two different phenomena (pluralism, reconciliation) could also be a sign of a certain amount of caution in approaching sudden changes in the socialist half of the globe, which in fact John Paul II declared to be the result of the heroic resistance of Christians towards totalitarianism and which promises quick compliance with demands for greater religious freedoms, but which at the same time places the Church in a qualitatively new situation to which, after all, it is unaccustomed to an unequaled degree. Because regardless of how much local prelates continue to resoundingly blame communist atheism for the “disgraces” of the 20th century, one should not lose sight of the fact that all of them began their working careers in this regime, that they have become used to solving the problems in the church-state relationship with this partner, whom, admittedly, they

have never "liked," but with whom they at least speak the same language. Things are so much more complicated that opposite the "strong state" there has developed—as perceived by retired Split-Makarska Archbishop Dr. Frane Franic—a "strong Church" as well, which built up a defense mechanism against the regime by eliminating or even "suppressing" differences within the Church ranks. Thus, the previously noted ban on membership in Christianity Today can be taken as a "classic example" of this aversive attitude towards pluralism within the Church. Indeed, this hitherto most controversial question of free activity in the Church has now been removed from the agenda through the recent decision by the Bishops Conference of Yugoslavia to withdraw the ban on membership in that organization. But in the meantime, Christianity Today has lost the greatest part of the attributes that at one point made it the key element of the "critical conscience" in the Church, while the effects of the lifting of the ban have remained primarily within the framework of reversing one apparently ill-considered decision—which was long taken as proof that the Church, which "talks" so much about violations of human liberties, is itself not free of blame in such matters—while it is difficult to talk about any contribution to pluralism within the Church.

Explicitly Political

All this is gaining importance since in the opinion of many people, only a free and "vulnerable" Church can meet the challenge of the whirlwind changes in socialism—or in what is left of it—in which the Church too will no longer be able to act like an internally highly-disciplined and outwardly reticent "fortress under siege." This explains approximately how long the rush of the pluralistic wave will last in Croatia and elsewhere in the country, and in the Church there remain questions about whether it is vocal enough as far as present-day changes are concerned, meaning is it doing what is necessary not to fall out of line with the changes that, with the Church or without it, are galloping forward. For many, this might sound like a fateful question, because in the historical memory of the "Church of the Rock," there is living recollection of the fact that the Catholic Church already fell out of step in the great historical revolutions—at the emergence of the bourgeois society and at the later awakening of the workers movement—and that in this third revolution, which so unexpectedly combines elements of the first two, this could happen once again. Admittedly, the Church has probably never made as many public statements about "non-Church" subjects as it is doing today. This began with its inclusion in the constitutional talks, in which representatives of all the major confessions in the country participated, and the Catholic Church also maintained this rhythm in several other questions deemed to be of essential or even critical importance to peaceful coexistence in this country. Cardinal Kuharic was among the first in Croatia to stand up publicly against the flood of accusations laid at the door of Croatia and the Church in Croatia, explaining in an interview with DANAS that the Church cannot stand

aside while "objective truths stand accused" (Admittedly, the cardinal himself is not always the most diligent person about "objective truth," especially not on anniversaries of the death of Cardinal Stepinac, but the way in which the current archbishop defends the former one—with statements to the effect that Stepinac was ostensibly the precursor of the council spirit or even a messenger of the "gentle revolution"—is perhaps the best way to hasten the late cardinal's passage into oblivion). Shortly thereafter, the archbishop of Zagreb publicly decried the use of force in Kosovo, repeating his objection during the latest events in the province, about which he says that "if the people make just demands and if they are prevented from doing so by violence and bloodshed, then that is the utterly wrong way to resolve the issue, because violence always breeds violence, and hatred always breeds hatred."

In the meantime, the cardinal has correctly perceived the far-reaching consequences of the events in East European countries—except, of course, for details linked to Stepinac—and the inevitability that the pluralistic processes from those quarters will cross our borders as well. At the traditional New Year's reception at with the president of the Assembly of the Socialist Republic [SR] Croatia, Kuharic said that a multiparty system is a "logical demand of democracy" in this era and that the Church follows what is going on in Croatia in this regard with "sympathy and hope." Ten days later, the Commission of the BKJ [expansion not given] for justice and peace issued an announcement in which it "calls on the believers of the Catholic Church and all other people to not allow themselves to become enslaved to the past (!), but rather assuredly, courageously, and responsibly to take part in public life in the political, cultural, economic, and every other domain in order to make progress in strengthening democracy, in respecting human rights, and in advancing the common good." The Commission renounces its ambition of recommending or "even committing believers to vote for a particular party," and for priests the decree from the church law is quoted: "You may not participate in political parties." For everything, however, the question revolves around an explicitly "political" statement in which the Commission carefully cites all the prerequisites of free elections—"otherwise, elections could be challenged as illegitimate"—and that means not only the right of parties to compete for power, but also equal treatment in terms of "finance, accommodations, technical assistance, and the other things that are needed in order to organize political organizations and meetings in all locations."

Prudent Reflection

Why, despite such frequent and "politicized" statements by Church people, is it sometimes possible within the Church itself to hear the notion that the Catholic Church is too reticent, that in this sense it is close to official Croatian policy, or that it is even more reticent than that policy. All in all, part of the reason for this is the implicit comparison with the Serbian Orthodox Church, even though that church, following the medieval logic of

"there is no strong state without a strong Church," has already become such a political "heavyweight" that to follow its example would be—as a high-ranking Church official tells us—"crazy." Thus, what remains is to search for reasons for the relative silence within the context of the rare "self-critical" statements by leading figures in the Chapter, including the recent statement by Cardinal Kuharic that "when more can be done, then more must be done." Of course, this "more" can also be achieved in various ways, some of which are more and some less acceptable, but it is thought that the Catholic Church is steering clear of a more direct political commitment, prudently avoiding a repeat of the example of the churches in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, where they were a direct actor in the "revolution of candles," or Hungary, where thus far the unthinkable step of cooperating with the state has been accepted, and several Catholic prelates have even consented to being elected to the national parliament. At least for right now, the Catholic Church in Croatia is being more cautious in developing relations with the local parties for democratic change, and this is not so much due to the fact that in our case it is communists who are setting them up—in recent times, more good words and open praise has been expressed for them, which until only yesterday was mind-boggling—as it is due to the assessment that more direct commitment could threaten the supernatural and superpolitical status of the Church, the loss of which would be very costly, at least here, in Croatia.

There is no doubt that such a position also merits higher appraisal as an expression of the prudent reflection that a more direct involvement of the Church in "politics" would inflame new polarization in the country, of which there is already too much. But one cannot rule out the possibility that such a position is in part the result of the sober assessment that this would increase the risk factor in the activities of that very Church, and that from that point of view it is advisable to retain something from the old "encircled" Church, which has viewed itself, as its critics have claimed, as being "competent in everything, but responsible for nothing." Only when these two

factors are recognized do some of the concrete positions of the Church become clearer, such as its position on the harmfulness of founding political organizations of lay believers, which is clearly the result of a correct estimation by Church leaders concerning the anachronistic nature of such symbioses of religion and politics, but at the same time, one should not forget that Christian parties pluralize the Church itself, and that some of the most democratic countries in the world contain this part of the pluralistic spectrum. It appears that this same "two-story" motive might explain the particular reserve exhibited towards other new parties as well, such as in the January commentary in GLAS KONCILA in which it is literally stated that "our local Church is not one of the socio-political forces—neither one of those in power nor one of those emerging as the opposition—churches have true interlocutors like them in other domains." This assessment, which, as we see, includes elements of a public "affront" towards parties, is further emphasized by other, anything but gentle statements, and it is noted that amidst the current changes everything is still "understated," that there is "care not to burn any bridges," and even that "true intentions are being concealed." Thus, the publication recommends that all that is necessary is to thoroughly study what is in fact going on and discover "the true manner of Church service to the people."

There is no doubt that after the attempts to draw the Church into the partisan "catch as catch can" as carried out by Tudman's party in Lisinski, the caution recommended by GLAS KONCILA will be even more justified for some Church people. But in this era of "escalated" changes, which call on the Church to adapt more quickly that it has ever had to, the fear of taking "one step too many" is linked with the danger that "one step too few" will be taken. As one of the regular Church chroniclers of our Church-political state of affairs said recently: "Many of the excuses that we have had up to now to the effect that nothing can be done are falling away, and the time of action has arrived. May we find the strength, and God help us."

HUNGARY

Conscientious Objectors: Considerations, Scope of Service Described

25000702 Budapest *MAGYARORSZAG* in Hungarian
6 Apr 90 p 33

[Article by Tamas Csapody: "National Defense: A Civilian Concern; Is the Country in Danger?"]

[Text] A heated debate preceded the introduction of civilian military service in Hungary. As the various alternative movements—parties, religious communities, mass organizations, associations with different profiles, and human rights organizations—gained strength, each formulated its own position on the matter of refusing military service. These views were voiced at various gatherings, and if only in brief, by the mass media. And although the legislative proposal concerning the introduction of civilian service did not become the subject of societal debate, one could clearly see how each ministry, state administrative organ, grass roots organization, or official movement or organization perceived the introduction of civilian military service. The issues which prompt debate relative to "instilling" the new form of service may be summarized as follows: How should one be able to acquire the status of civilian service? The problem of the committee which "examines conscience": Should some kind of organization be established to judge the applications, and if so, who is entitled to make such judgments? Who may choose this form of service and at what point? (Before being sworn in; but could a person of military age who is subject to call, or a reservist, make this choice upon receipt of the call to duty?) What reasons may be claimed and accepted in regard to such requests? (Matters of conscience, ethical considerations, a person's outlook on the world, humanitarian considerations, political grounds?) What character should this service have? Who should pay the expenses incurred by the civilian service (Ministry of Finance, State Wage and Labor Affairs Office [ABMH], Ministry of Health and Social Welfare [SZEM]?), and what accommodations should the civilian service corps have (barracks, workers' lofts, residing at home)? What should be the duration of civilian service (36-30-28-24-18 months)?

If They Would Agree

The Ministry of Defense was concerned about incurring a significant loss, the ABMH and SZEM were worried about the placement of the civilian corps, and the Ministry of Finance feared the financial consequences of the entire affair. Many, including the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Industry, did not believe in advance indications based on European experience, i.e. that only a three to five percent ratio of persons subject to military duty would opt for civilian service. The Ministry of Defense's concerns were based on its own sociological assessment. According to a survey of 1,500 new recruits conducted in August 1988, 54.9 percent of those questioned would have chosen civilian duty, 19.4 percent would have opted for

unarmed service, and 24.6 percent for armed duty, provided that the length of service for both armed and civilian duty were the same. In the case of a 24-month tour of duty without arms, and a 30-month civilian service duty a reverse ratio appears: The distribution in the same sequence would be 20.6, 16.3, and 59.9 percent.

The parliament that convened in June 1989 adopted an amended version of the new national defense law after lengthy and occasionally heated debate. This was the legislative proposal which included provisions for the introduction of civilian service. Under this law, beginning on 7 July 1989 there exists an opportunity in Hungary for men of military age who have not taken the military oath, and for men in reserve status, to perform "duties primarily of a health care and social welfare character" for 28 months as part of the civilian service, and a 24 plus four-month unarmed military service, in due regard to claims related to a person's conscience, and based on a decision by the committee which "examines conscience," and by the recruiting command. As a second alternative, civilian duty may involve only nonprofit work performance for the public good. This dual definition of the work to be performed is no different from what we find in international practice. Also remarkable is the fact that these rules clearly follow progressive European traditions. This cannot be said, however, about the judging of applications, and about the length of service. Practice will show ultimately how the second alternative for work performance will be interpreted. Should this be understood to mean the performance of tasks within the peace movement, in humanitarian and human rights organization, in foundations, and in relation to the protection of nature and the environment, or should such work include road construction, work performed in the postal service and in mass transportation, or perhaps the performance of civil defense and disaster abatement tasks?

The artificial filter ("committee to examine conscience") and the 28-month duration of service may be questionable on several bases, including human rights, rational and fairness considerations, and the interests of health care and social welfare. It is not in the interest of any society which builds on preventative concepts, and on continuous and ever decreasing social security to "expropriate" for a 28-month period men who are just about to start their careers, establishing families and their existence. (Accordingly, it could have been expected that the combination of the built-in filter and the duration could become a deterrent factor resulting in no applicants, or the number of applicants would be minimal!)

15,000 at Most

Civilian duty may be performed only for employers registered by the ABMH upon recommendations received from ministries and organs having national jurisdiction. ("Employers for persons having received permission to perform civilian duty shall be designated by the specialized administrative organ having jurisdiction based on permanent residence.") In designating an employer, consideration must be given to the request made by the person to

serve civilian duty. In simple terms: An opportunity is given for the person performing civilian duty to choose a workplace in the health care or social welfare field which best fits his personality and talents.

Compensation to be paid for the work is commensurate with the amount received by enlisted men with no rank (640 forints per month), but the person performing civilian duty is entitled to a monthly allotment (500 forints) for the use of his own clothing, and the employer is obligated to provide three meals per day, free of charge. In terms of calculating social security and pension rights, the consequences related to civilian duty will be the same as for active duty soldiers.

"At their request, persons serving civilian duty are entitled to receive free of charge accommodations, to be provided by the employer," according to the law which enables the person performing civilian duty to live at home. (In summary, a member of the civilian corps covers his clothing and housing costs, and all other expenses incurred over and above the cost of three meals per day and mass transportation out of 1,140 forints for 28 months.)

The cost of putting a person performing civilian duty to work is paid by the employer. State and religious institutions as well as social organizations may request the reimbursement of clothing and travel costs incurred by the person performing civilian duty from the Employment Fund. In this way employers truly have access to cheap labor, because a situation may occur in which the person performing civilian duty will reside at home, while the provisions granted to him are being reimbursed by the Employment Fund.

Last October the Ministry of Defense publicized its data concerning refusals to perform military duty and concerning civilian duty. Accordingly, as of 29 September, 234 persons applied to perform civilian duty prior to reporting for duty, and 255 persons after reporting for duty. Seventy-eight persons wanted to perform unarmed duty. Fourteen members of the reserve corps wanted to perform civilian duty, while three persons requested that they perform unarmed military duty. Forty-three persons (Jehova's Witnesses) were not willing to perform any kind of duty at all. Barely one percent of the between 25,000 and 28,000 new recruits chose alternative duty (i.e. civilian and unarmed military duty). Accordingly, practice disproved the initial assessments, i.e. both the (Defense Ministry) survey result of 20.6 percent and the estimates of between three and five percent, when not quite one percent chose civilian duty. Instead of the 503 persons choosing civilian duty, the Defense ministry expected to see 2,000, nevertheless it established the permissible limit for the number of persons performing civilian duty at 15,000.

Small Chance

There may be many reasons for the one-percent ratio. Could it be that our military traditions are so strong, that the army is so attractive? Could it be that the societal view that a man who has served in the military is better than the rest still holds? Could it be that the idea of a national army has

gained strength, and that a feeling that the "homeland is threatened" has become pervasive? These feelings do not dominate, in my view. The reasons may be found much rather in being uninformed, in the quality of civilian duty, and in regulations. The present regulators offer unreal, irrational choices. Generally, civilian duty represents a longer tour of duty than military service. The extended period amounts to 16 months in the case of university (academy) graduates, 10 months for persons subject to call for military duty, and between 10 and 16 months for reservists. According to rules in effect, if, e.g., a 30-, 40-, or 50-year-old person subject to call for military service after 12 months of military duty follows his conscience and does not wish to be a part of the army, he may leave his job and entrust the livelihood of his family to good luck (or to the social safety net), and may serve for 16 months, free of charge, as part of the civilian corps. The same person subject to call for military duty could remain quietly in reserve status. In that case, based on the actual data of the past 12-15 years, he would have only a 41-percent chance of going on paid reserve duty for five days, a 35-percent chance for 20 days, a 15-percent chance for two months, and a nine-percent chance for five months. In a simplified form: If a person wishes to enforce his human and legal right he may choose between working for free for a period of 16 months and performing paid military duty ranging from five days to five months. (One may also expect a change in this regard, of course, because beginning in August the length of active military duty will be reduced to 12 months, while the term for reserve duty will decline to 20 days.)

All of this means that for the time being we will have to wait for the filling of social welfare and health care positions with persons performing civilian duty. This summer when the National Assembly returns to this issue it is likely that legislators will experience pressure from two sides: from the direction of democracy and the increased prevalence of human rights on the one hand, and from the side of further deteriorating social welfare and health care conditions on the other.

POLAND

General Defends Army Bureaucracy, Gives Reduction Statistics

90EP0436B Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
21 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by Brigadier General Marian Daniluk: "The Army In Another Way, But Without Myths"]

[Text] In issue number 31 of RZECZPOSPOLITA, under the byline "The Army In Another Way," Deputy Jacek Szymanderski was interviewed by Jan Forowicz. According to Deputy Szymanderski, our armed forces have two primary duties: to enable the realization of Poland's "foreign policy in such a way that its interests would be protected," and "to protect its people and

property against natural calamities and ecological disasters." Then the deputy suggests the army be reduced by one-third so that "the money saved could be dispersed elsewhere."

In reality, Article 8 of the Constitution designates the task of the armed forces: "The Armed Forces of the Polish Republic safeguard the sovereignty and independence of the Polish nation, its security and peace." Although the growth of political detente diminishes the possibility of armed confrontation, one should not disregard the real military potentials, doctrinal assumptions and operational plans of individual countries and blocs of nations. (The lengthy and scrupulous analyses of the strengths of armed forces during the Vienna disarmament talks attest to the gravity of these matters.) We should not forget this, especially as long as permanent political-military stability is not achieved in Europe and Poland's western and northern borders are not acknowledged unconditionally as final.

Linking the armed forces' primary tasks to the recent dispute "concerning the freedom of navigation in the Pomeranian Bay," as deputy Szymanderski does in the mentioned interview, is a misconception. From the beginning this problem was within the jurisdiction of the diplomatic services exclusively. To involve the armed forces, even symbolically, to resolve similar international problems would be a dangerous precedent and contrary to Poland's peace policy.

It also is difficult to agree that the armed forces are responsible for protecting the population against natural calamities. The armed forces participate in rescue missions, but these are not priority tasks for the armed forces. After all, appropriate services as well as the civil defense were formed to accomplish these actual tasks.

The size of our armed forces is another matter. Not too long ago it numbered over 400,000. By the end of this year there are supposed to be about 300,000, and even less if the international situation allows it. Three thousand career personnel changed their service status, and over 2,000 had to transfer to other garrisons. During the first stage of the changes, the central institutions of the Ministry of Defense and the operational staffs will be reduced by 30 percent. For example, merging the Air Force and the National Air Defense Forces [WOPK] alone will eliminate over 200 staff positions. With regard to the size of armed forces, we slipped to ninth place in Europe. The percentage of Poland's residents who are members of the armed forces decreased to 0.83 percent, which puts us in 12th place in Europe.

Decreasing the economic possibilities of the country has brought with it reductions in the defense budget. During the 1987-89 period it was reduced by about 25 percent, in constant prices. In 1989 real outlays for defense fell about 16 percent as a result of inflation alone. The draft Ministry of Defense budget for 1990 calls for further reductions in real terms. It is called a "survival budget" because, in addition to providing for the maintenance of

career cadres and basic service soldiers, it allots funds only for necessary modernization of armaments, the most essential exploitation of technology and maintaining continuity of training. The cost of daily food provisions per person (3,800 kcal) by itself increased last year 26-fold. And, of course, to this must be added the cost of uniforms, housing and health care, and outlays for social goals, culture and the like, which also increased greatly as a result of inflation.

The complexity of the allotted percentages and the difficulty of the selections are attested to by the fact that the savings achieved in one year by reducing the armed forces by 10,000 basic service soldiers or 4,000 career soldiers would enable us to purchase, for example, only two modern fighter airplanes.

Thus, how can one reconcile the growing outlays with the reduced budget? To do so let us compare the situation to a household budget in which the greatest percentage outlays are for daily family living expenses and there is no money for savings. Thus, it is not poor army organization that causes the criticized method of budget allocations, but the specific ongoing economic and market situation.

In conclusion, I wish to discuss the saddest situation of all, which makes one reflect. There were many baseless generalizations in the interview in which it is charged, for example, that there exists "a bureaucratic apparatus in the bloated institutions of the Ministry of Defense," and that a large army is being maintained to benefit officers who are "making a career," and the like. It is sad because, among other things, they are stated by a deputy, a vice chairman of the Sejm Commission on National Defense in the columns of RZECZPOSPOLITA.

Pension Situation of Military Retirees Viewed

*90EP0437A Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI
in Polish 27 Feb 90 p 5*

[Interview with Lt. Colonel Jozef Dziedzic, Department of Finance, Ministry of National Defense, by Lt. Colonel Andrzej Medykowski: "Pensions—Breaking Even"—place and date not given]

[Medykowski] Prices increased rapidly again in January and, therefore, so did the cost of living. Retirees and pensioners found themselves in an exceptionally difficult situation. What will happen?

[Dziedzic] On February 8 the Council of Ministers issued a decree increasing pension and retirement benefits starting 1 January 1990. As a result, the Social

Security Agency [ZUS] will pay in March pension and retirement benefits that will be increased by the anticipated index of average wage increases in the first quarter relative to the fourth quarter of last year. Naturally, ZUS will also provide compensatory payments for the period beginning 1 January and at the same time deduct the 160,000 zlotys advance payment.

[Medykowski] That applies to everyone in Poland. How is this problem vis-a-vis military pension and retirement benefits?

[Dziedzic] Payments to people entitled to military retirement and pension benefits will also be increased appropriately beginning 1 January 1990.

[Medykowski] Who does this apply to, and what will the index be?

[Dziedzic] The base of assessment of benefits for military people discharged from service up to 31 December 1989 will be increased by 102.78 percent, but no more than 847,900 zlotys.

[Medykowski] Retirement and pension benefits will be increased shortly. This has happened frequently lately, but the money—that due to the increases—reaches the beneficiaries several months late and, as a result of inflation, is not worth much. Will it take as long this time?

[Dziedzic] A very good question. The decree was passed 8 February, and the decisions granting the increased benefits should reach ZUS branches a month ahead of time. Therefore, to make the March payments, the decisions should have been received before the decree was even signed. Thus, the minister of national defense decided to pay in March an additional advance of 200,000 zlotys. It will be paid together with current benefits.

However, the new, increased retirement and pension payments will take into account the compensatory payments for the first quarter as well as the two advance payments amounting to 360,000 zlotys that were paid in installments (160,000 in February and 200,000 in March).

Using these emergency procedures, we would like to compensate, at least partially, for the month's delay in receiving the entitled increase.

[Medykowski] Does this mean that the newly increased retirement and pension benefit will not be paid until 1 April?

[Dziedzic] Yes. The decisions concerning these increases in military retirement and pension benefits will reach ZUS by 26 February at the latest.

[Medykowski] One begins to wonder here, especially after many telephone conversations and reading letters to the editor, if these "emergency procedures" have not become the way your activity operates.

[Dziedzic] Of course not. However, it is necessary. Such a style of operation from the viewpoint of a retiree or pensioner is unacceptable. In association with this, our ministry submitted proposals to improve the payment of military benefits. If they will be included in the new pension and retirement benefits law, then the military retirement organs will be responsible for all operations in this area. To this end, military retirement offices in 16 voivodships were equipped with proper equipment. This will permit employees to be utilized rationally and needs in this area to be fully satisfied.

If the Sejm makes the appropriate decisions, all responsibilities will be transferred from ZUS to us by the end of this year at the latest. The organizational work has already advanced significantly.

[Medykowski] In conclusion, let us return to the decree mentioned in the beginning. Does it include anything else of importance to the military community?

[Dziedzic] Beginning 1 January the minimum dependent benefits as well as group I and II disability benefits were increased to 256,000 zlotys. This also applies to female group III disability pensioners who are at least 55 years old and to male group III disability pensioners who are at least 60 years old.

However, disability pensions for all others were increased to 198,000 zlotys per month.

The nursing allowance was also increased to 76,800 zlotys per month, and the energy lump-sum for combat veterans was increased to 15,000 zlotys per month.

Declassified Maps of 1:200,000 Scale Now Provide Specifics

90EP0436A Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish
21 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

[Article by Zbigniew Wyczasany: "Finally Clear, Everything On A Map"]

[Text] Ten to 15 years ago one could order and buy from specialized firms in the West, literally for pennies, satellite photographs of any part of the world, including one's own territory, on a scale useful to a geodesist. Meanwhile, in Poland, "vigilance" was the order of the day. Working during the 1978-81 period in the Office of the Government Plenipotentiary for Managing the Vistula River, I remember how difficult it was and how much effort it took to obtain satellite photographs of the Vistula River and its tributaries from military and civilian geodesy collections. Thus one could imagine the surprise of those people visiting the above office who had to deal with the "secret chancelleries" to see the open display in the corridors of photographs of the queen of our rivers. We enlarged several such photographs, which were purchased in one of the private geodesy offices in Rome, to poster size. The enlarged printing plate was executed at the Central Photographic Agency [CAF] on Fokska Street, also for pennies.

Even though it seemed that everything was clear for everyone, one could not publish the American photographs because of state secrets in Poland. People abroad could see it, but in Poland there was a military prohibition.

Shortly afterward all of Poland was mottled with enameled tables reading "Photographing Prohibited." I do not know if anyone has calculated the cost of that silly marking.

Considering the above, the decision of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces to make detailed topographic maps widely accessible to the public is certainly a great

event. Topographic maps of Poland on a 1:200,000 scale (1 cm on the map = 2 km) are now being produced by the presses. The map is based on satellite photographs taken in 1987.

It shows everything: bridges, roads, power lines, river fords, elevated points, individual trees and airports with their runway directional signs.

The declassification of this map is in step with the general world trend in this area. One can suppose that an even larger scale of this map will be declassified. In any case, the Ottawa Conference declaration concerning open skies found a response in Poland.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Agricultural Economics Reform Discussed

90GE0049A East Berlin IPW BERICHTe in German
Vol 19 No 3, Mar 90 pp 39-43

[Article by Prof. Dr. Horst Schilling, Institute for Policy and Economics: "Using the Experience of Foreign Countries—Thoughts on Economic Reform in the Agricultural Sector"]

[Text] Irrespective of whether we regard the national economy of the GDR as a whole or only [look at] its agricultural sector, the absolute necessity for far-reaching economic reforms is enormous. Two general tasks are to be mastered: first, those distortions and excesses in our economic system which are the result of excessive centralization and of an administrative, partially even arbitrary economy, must be overcome. For another, the fact that the centrally planned economy, which was put into operation after World War II in all socialist countries under very specific economic and political conditions, has long since reached its limitations and was no longer able to meet modern requirements on the national as well as the international scale, has to be taken into account. That this factor was recognized far too late and was then also not accepted by the leading forces in our country is the principal reason for the great economic problems which now confront us.

What this means for the upcoming economic reform is that it must encompass both the urgently needed short-term corrections as well as the longer-term orientation toward an up-to-date economic system which meets modern requirements. In this regard, a special problem exists in shaping those immediate measures which are essential for stabilizing and revitalizing our economy in today's concrete and extremely tense situation in such a manner that they are at the same time appropriate for a longer-term strategic orientation or, at the very least, would not run counter to it. However, the complications of achieving this status in a specific case are demonstrated, among other things, e.g., by the fact that the opening of the borders requires additional regimentation measures to protect our domestic markets and our currency—in other words, measures which stand contrary to the liberalization of all economic sectors for which we are striving.

Economic Reform—What Does This Mean for Agriculture?

From the special viewpoint of agriculture, the following aspects are of immediate significance in view of the economic reform:

First. Changes which are urgently necessary in the overall economic interest, for example, changes in the planning system or with respect to price and subsidy policies, will have an extremely lasting effect on agriculture as well. Consequently, in preparing such steps and in reaching appropriate resolutions, the affairs of this

important economic sector, which is decisive for the assurance of alimentation for the populace, must be appropriately considered from the very beginning.

Second. Intensification and increased efficiency pertaining to agricultural and foodstuffs production requires structural changes in our national economy in the direction of a clear upward reevaluation of those branches of the economy which are immediately associated with agriculture. This involves, primarily, mastery of the long-known problems associated with spare parts supplies, the provision of modern, high-efficiency agricultural equipment, problems which exist with respect to agricultural construction as well as those involving the storage and processing of agricultural products.

Third. In agriculture itself there are still some quite considerable reserves which can be used to increase performance capability and efficiency. Many of these can be liberated by the very fact that agricultural enterprises will be given the opportunity to decide independently and upon their own responsibility, basing their decisions on the knowledge and competence of cooperative farmers and agricultural workers, regarding their structure, the formation of their external relationships, and their future development.

This naturally does not mean that the agricultural workers should be left to their own devices during this complicated situation. In view of the political changes in our country and in view of the upcoming economic reforms, agricultural scientists, and particularly agricultural economists, are called upon.

How Are the Sciences Prepared To Collaborate With Respect to the Economic Reform?

This duty must be perceived with a new type of self-conception on the part of the sciences and a heightened sense of responsibility. The partnership relationship vis-a-vis farmers is to be intensified. Coupled with a renunciation of any kind of know-it-all attitude, the findings of science must be submitted to practice as an offering, the application and utilization of which, however, must be the subject of decisions by farmers themselves, in consideration of their specific conditions. At the same time, scientists themselves must bring the results of their work to public discussion with more self-awareness and in an "unfiltered" manner and must make it available to the appropriate state and social bodies for political decision-making, even if the scientific headstart, measured in terms of the large tasks involved, is still quite modest.

Certainly, in the past, upcoming problems and their solutions, necessary changes, and further development in our agriculture were the subject of contemplation. Yet, as long as this could not occur in public and in the form of a true conflict of opinions, as long as it was not possible to call obvious erroneous developments by name and to discuss alternatives to the officially proclaimed agricultural policy, no real theoretical headstart could be created. It is all the more necessary now to come to solid solutions which promise success in a step-by-step

manner in an intensive and candid dialogue in which scientists and practitioners from the most varied sectors contribute their knowledge and their experiences.

It appears to me to be important, in addition to finding the right ways with regard to the measures to be introduced, that we also develop a true eye for the correct pace of introduction. For sure, an abundance of urgent problems has accumulated in our agriculture. Some of these can and must be solved relatively rapidly and in an uncomplicated manner with common sense, goodwill, and in renunciation of inhibiting bureaucratic regulations. In addition, however, there are also questions of a very fundamental nature, requiring comprehensive consideration and a conscientious approach. Here, hasty and inadequately prepared decisions could have a disastrous effect. And it is particularly with regard to agricultural production that it is important to avoid setbacks in any event, since the security of feeding our population is involved. And, furthermore, our past experiences indicate that decisions which may be correct in principle can turn sour if the required prerequisites for their prosecution—be they objective or subjective—are not given.

In our thinking with regard to the subsequent development of agriculture and the foodstuffs industry in our country, it is important to make greater use than hitherto of the experiences in this area which have been gathered in foreign countries. There are two weighty reasons to do so:

First. A priority project for the economic reform must involve a breakthrough in the economic and intellectual isolation suffered by the GDR, which has increased ever more in recent years, and to again bring us closer into the system of international economic relations, the international division of labor and the exchange of goods, and scientific-technical know-how. This applies to the agricultural and foodstuffs economy just as it does to the national economy overall and is equally true with respect to relationships with socialist as well as capitalist countries. The strengthening of international economic relationships, however, presupposes that our own economy is capable of communicating and cooperating with foreign countries. This "compatibility" must be currently established primarily with respect to the capitalist world economic system, both because of that system's economic strength and scientific-technical development status, but also because of our special need to catch up in this regard.

Second. Developmental processes abroad, particularly in countries having the most capable and most efficient agricultural economies, can provide us with much impetus for the solution of the problems confronting us. This is equally true of the development of productive forces, as it is with respect to questions of organization and management of production and circulation. In this regard, I continue to represent the view that a formal takeover of individual forms of organization, structures, and operating mechanisms of the capitalist economic system cannot be a solution for us. We should proceed on the basis that the scientific-technical progress and increasing tendencies toward internationalization today

confront every highly developed national economy with a multiplicity of analogous requirements which must be taken into account by any given country in accordance with its given specific conditions. This also includes a reevaluation, on our part, of certain developmental processes in capitalist agriculture.

What Is the Developmental Status in GDR Agriculture in Terms of International Comparison?

A point of departure for a substantive discussion regarding the future development of our agriculture must involve realistic concepts with regard to the developmental status achieved in international comparison. Here, without any embellishment, it can be stated that many of our agricultural producer cooperatives and state-owned farms have a high performance potential—even measured by international yardsticks. Within CEMA, GDR agriculture actually assumes a leading position in many respects. Unfortunately, detailed performance comparisons with capitalist countries having similar comparable natural production conditions are still missing or rather, they have thus far not been published in our country. However, it is a fact that we absolutely need not hide from many of these comparisons. Nevertheless, it is also true that we show considerable deficits with regard to those countries which have the most performance-capable agricultures—and, after all, we must orient ourselves in accordance with them and measure ourselves by their standards.

If this is to be documented with a few facts below, it must be stated that such a comparison of individual indicators must always remain limited with respect to its ability to serve as an indicator, primarily in comparing differing economic systems and particularly with respect to the high volume of natural factors affecting agricultural production.

In consideration of these limitations, the comparison of per hectare yields and livestock performances is most revealing. In order to eliminate the effects of extreme weather conditions over the last two crop years, the three-year average for 1985-87 is used for comparison purposes:

Item	Denmark	Netherlands	FRG	GDR
Yields in 100 kg/hectare:				
Wheat	59	72	61	54
Rye	42	44	41	36
Barley	47	55	48	48
Potatoes	352	429	348	250
Sugar beets	445	529	514	338
Performance per animal and year:				
Milk (liters)	5,531	5,263	4,702	3,938
Eggs (each)	328	276	249	220

The significance of the yield differences, for example, with respect to the FRG, becomes discernible on the basis of the fact that the GDR, among others, harvests only approximately 50 percent more potatoes from an area which is more than twice as large. Or, in other words, if the GDR was to achieve yields equal to those in the FRG, the same quantity of potatoes could be harvested from an area which is approximately 120,000 hectares smaller. With respect to wheat, the yield level for the FRG would yield a similar harvest quantity on approximately 60,000 hectares less land, and with respect to rye, we could make do with 100,000 hectares less land. The savings in seed stock, mechanical work, and fuels and the significant increase in labor productivity which could thus be achieved are clear.

Of no less importance is the additional cost in the form of structures, fodder, and labor which results from our almost 20-percent lower milk performance per animal. The fact that an important reason for this shortage lies in the extensive orientation toward the use of domestic fodder is applicable. But it is, nevertheless, only one reason and, moreover, this decision is also to be rethought in view of its national economic efficiency. It is well known that practitioners and scientists have long expressed appropriate doubts without, however, finding an audience among those who were responsible at the time.

A direct comparison of labor productivity in agriculture between the GDR and the highly developed capitalist countries is particularly complicated because, in the last decades, our agriculture took a completely different direction of development than that in the capitalist countries. Whereas in the capitalist countries the division of labor connected with scientific-technical progress was increasingly connected with eliminating ever more work processes from agricultural enterprises and transferring them to associated economic branches, our large-scale socialist enterprises plied the path of intraenterprise division of labor more forcefully and even partially took on nonagricultural operations, for example, in the construction and repair industries, in the social sector, in the development of the rural infrastructure. Certainly, some of these developments are economically purposeful, particularly in the interest of continuously utilizing agricultural manpower. Others, however, should, in my opinion, be reexamined in view of their usefulness and efficiency. In any event, developments in capitalist industrial countries indicate that a performance-capable services sector contributes substantially to the rapid prosecution of scientific-technical progress in the agricultural economy and can, simultaneously, realize good profits.

For the above reasons, a direct comparison of the conditions between those employed in agricultural enterprises and the land area worked by them or gross production cannot result in a realistic comparison of labor productivity in the GDR with that in the capitalist countries. This must be particularly emphasized because the comparisons of manpower per 100 hectares of agricultural land, which are frequently brought up by the Western

side, are anything but sound. Added to this is the fact that the man-year per worker in capitalist countries is substantially higher. Thus, the average weekly worktime for a farmer in the FRG is 64.5 hours and a regular annual vacation is something most of them cannot even visualize. Nevertheless, the data available to us permit the conclusion that the disparity between GDR agriculture and the agriculture of developed capitalist countries in terms of labor productivity is not smaller, but rather even greater (for example, vis-a-vis the United States) than is the case with per hectare yields.

How Are Things With Respect to the Efficiency of Large-Scale Agricultural Enterprises?

If one proceeds on the assumption that small peasant economies predominate in the agriculture of West European countries and that the average farm size is still modest (1985, it was 65 hectares in Great Britain, 31 hectares in Denmark, 27 hectares in France, 16 hectares in the FRG, and 15 hectares in the Netherlands), the question arises whether this does not indicate a greater degree of efficiency on the part of smaller enterprises in agriculture. The answer is a clear "no." It is precisely the capitalist countries which indicate that performance capability and efficiency in agriculture increase with enterprise size as a rule and that is why the concentration process continues to advance.

Within the EC (10), the number of agricultural enterprises declined by about 1.8 million from 1970 to 1988, representing an average decline of 100,000 enterprises per year.

The serious differences in the yield situation between large-scale and small enterprises in the countries of the EC should not and cannot be addressed here in more detail. However, reference needs to be made to the example of the United States, where less than five percent of an overall total of more than two million farms accounts for 80 percent of total agricultural market production. This number includes 1.2 percent of farms which have an annual turnover of more than \$500,000 and which account for 33 percent of market production. They are headed by a few so-called megafarms which have an annual turnover of more than \$100 million.

The large-scale agricultural enterprises in the United States, as well as in Western Europe contradict the thesis, which has recently been voiced by certain circles with a view to the socialist countries more strongly than heretofore, that large-scale production in agriculture cannot be shaped with efficiency. However, these circles tend to deny the advantages of agricultural large-scale production. And in this connection, the example of the capitalist countries makes it clear that there is always a certain optimum size to the concentration in plant and

livestock production with respect to the individual production units. If these limitations are exceeded, negative economic and ecological effects (and the latter sooner or later, at least at the national economic level, prove to be economic disadvantages) outweigh the positive concentration effects. These limitations are not of fixed and uniform magnitudes. They are constantly changing with scientific-technical developments and must be determined separately by region.

If at the present time the concentration process in the agriculture of Western Europe has not progressed further, then this is in no event attributable primarily to economic factors. On the contrary, the free functioning of the economic laws of capitalism would most certainly have led to a substantially more rapid structural change in agriculture if agricultural policy had not intervened in a regulatory manner for predominantly social and political motives—and most recently to an increased extent from ecological viewpoints.

In this connection, a study which was recently published in the FRG is of interest; the study was commissioned by the Enquete Commission and entitled "Technical Consequences—Estimates" of the Bundestag and was worked out by scientists from various institutes and advanced schools. Among others, the study examines the effects of the unlimited prosecution of scientific-technical progress under world market conditions upon the agriculture of the FRG. The authors reached the conclusion that the rapid dismantling of all state subsidies and patronage provisions would, given the free play of economic forces under world market conditions, result in the concentration of agricultural production in the area of northern Germany within the FRG in a few decades and states that the major portion of the land used for agriculture would be operated by enterprises having more than 10,000 hectares of land each. Since both of these developments are indefensible, either from the social and political viewpoints or from the ecological and area planning viewpoints, the scientists are opening three alternative agricultural management scenarios for discussion. They are developing the models for a "pluralization of agriculture," a "modern type of extensive operation," as well as a model for a "peasant agriculture involving the use of adapted technologies." However, each of the three models is only realizable with the use of massive and specifically targeted state regulatory measures.

Which Prerequisites Are Desirable To Accomplish Efficient Agricultural Large-Scale Production?

For purposes of efficient agricultural production, and particularly for large-scale agricultural production in the capitalist countries, the following prerequisites appear to me to be of particular significance:

- The continuous supply of modern state-of-the-art, high-quality, extensively differentiated, and specialized means of production (the adaptation of the means of production to varying natural production conditions and enterprise structures appears as being

more efficient than the adaptation of enterprise size to the use of certain large equipment);

- A developed rural infrastructure with a performance-capable services sector. Both of these features gain ever greater significance with respect to the prosecution and efficient utilization of scientific-technical progress features in agriculture;
- A developed vertical integration in the agricultural sector with rigid organizational and management structures which encompass the various stages of agricultural production, including land tillage and product processing, through to marketing.

Thus, it is discernible that the efficiency of large-scale agricultural production is heavily dependent upon the developmental level and the performance capability of the overall economy. This is also one of the explanations for the still quite substantial performance and structural differences which exist between agriculture in the north and in the southern regions of the EC.

In addition, however, it must also be said that in the most developed capitalist nations the side-by-side existence of enterprises of various sizes and of differing socioeconomic character is proving to be an advantage since a certain division of labor with respect to specific production and supply functions has developed between them. Thus, small enterprises frequently act as suppliers for large-scale enterprises. Moreover, the small enterprises supply regional markets or closed production gaps in the consumer market which are not sufficiently attractive to the large integrated production and marketing systems.

For us in the GDR, it therefore appears appropriate to strive for stronger differentiation in our agricultural structure (both with respect to enterprise size and production structures and possibly forms of ownership as well). It would thus be better possible to meet the varying natural production conditions in our country, as well as the specific requirements of individual products and markets.

As far as the first-named requirements with respect to the provision of the means of production, the development of an infrastructure and a special services sector for agriculture are concerned, the material and financial conditions for this development had been limited in the past and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Every assumption to the contrary is unrealistic in the face of the overall economic situation in our country. And this applies both to the area of self-financing and to the possibilities of revenue enhancement as a result of foreign trade. But it is precisely such a tense situation that requires the optimum distribution of available resources on a national economic scale and within agriculture. And the experiences of the past indicate that bureaucratically administered distribution and allocation of resources which are in limited supply does not facilitate their efficient application. In this connection, it must also be stated, however, that the investments granted the agricultural and foodstuffs economy in the GDR over recent years—and this is confirmed by international comparisons—lay below the level which was desirable and justifiable from the viewpoint of the national economy as

well as from the viewpoint of the enterprises. This is not only true of the volume, but also to a still greater extent of its structure and quality.

How Is It With Subsidies for Agriculture?

The claim that our agriculture and foodstuffs economy has, for years, been disadvantaged when it came to the distribution of social funds would appear to be questionable in view of the considerable state subsidies paid to the agricultural and alimentation sector. For this reason, but primarily because the subsidy policy is generally one of the central problems in the current discussion occurring in our country, it appears appropriate to make a reference to the fact that the agricultural subsidies in capitalist nations are also among the heavily disputed economic policy problems. And this is true not only on a national level, but in the agricultural subsidies which are the subject of serious conflicts between individual capitalist countries.

It should first be stated that high subsidies are paid particularly in the highly developed capitalist nations which have very efficient agricultural systems. According to estimates of the OECD, subsidies account for approximately 30 percent of agricultural income in the United States, about 50 percent in the countries of the EC, and actually 70 percent in Japan. Part of the subsidies come from the national budget and part are paid directly by consumers by pegging prices for domestic agricultural products over those of world market prices.

This immediately raises the question as to why such subsidies are paid at all since, in most of these countries, agricultural overproduction exists? Of the manifold economic, political, and social reasons, let us identify only the most important ones here: In view of the strategic significance of a maximum degree of self-sufficiency, at least with respect to basic foodstuffs, the various governments are interested in maintaining their own agricultural industries, even if the production costs are higher than world market prices. This motivation is most clearly visible with respect to Japan, but is also applicable for numerous other countries. Added to this is the fact that the actual production costs of domestic agriculture are, for political as well as total economic reasons (for example, in the interest of international competitiveness on the part of the industry), not intended to be fully reflected in food prices and, thus, also in wage levels. Moreover, in most capitalist countries, income deficits suffered by farmers in regions which are disadvantaged by nature are equalized by the use of certain specific subsidies. And, finally, some of the subsidies, particularly in recent times, are understood to be compensation for landscape-promoting and environment-maintenance performances in agriculture.

Moreover, it is known that a majority of the payments which are declared to be agricultural subsidies do not benefit agriculture at all, but rather enter the cash registers of large-scale enterprises involved in agricultural commodities trading, warehousing, and the processing industry, either directly or indirectly. This is quite rightfully the subject of serious criticism on the part of farmers and their

professional representatives, but at the same time it is a motivational force favoring the rapid development of these economic branches under capitalism.

From this, it can first be concluded that very diverse economic and social reasons can exist for the granting of agricultural subsidies, even in countries which have an efficient agriculture. And so the question does not arise for us as to whether there should or should not be agricultural subsidies. What is necessary, moreover, is to think about the correct volume and, primarily, the suitable forms so that the subsidies promote economic and social progress and do not hamper it. And, additional conclusions can be derived from the developments and conflicts in the capitalist countries: It, thus, appears to me to be urgently necessary to clearly differentiate between subsidizing consumer prices for food and the actual subsidies paid to agriculture. At the latest, since the agricultural price reforms in the GDR it is clear that a majority of the formerly paid agricultural subsidies were and are, in actual fact, consumer subsidies. At one time, they certainly had an important social function, but have, in the meantime, increasingly developed into a national economic impediment and are to be replaced in the future by appropriate wage policy measures. On the other hand, subsidies paid to agriculture itself represent efforts to stimulate greater efficiency by deliberate and differentiated allocations.

However, it is primarily necessary to take into account that agricultural enterprises benefit from money—irrespective of the form in which it is realized, either directly via prices or in the form of subsidies or credits—only if they receive the necessary means of production at the required design and quality level. Financial allocations without material security are ineffective; why, they even seduce people to violate the conservation principle, for example, when unsuitable machinery is purchased or other less meaningful investments are activated so that unused funds need not be returned.

What Can Be Learned From the Organization and Management of Agricultural Production Under Capitalism?

Taking into account the fundamental differences in the developmental level and given the socioeconomic structures between our agriculture and our national economy and those of the Western European countries, I believe that the study of the forms as well as organization, control, and management of capitalist agribusiness can furnish numerous stimuli with respect to the upcoming agrarian reforms in our country. In this respect, the following appear to me to be of interest:

- the manifold forms of contractual cooperation between agricultural enterprises as well as between those enterprises and the enterprises in related economic branches;
- the organization of multilevel contractual systems with their product line orientation toward end products, particularly the rigid contractual setting of unified standard values, quality standards, binding

delivery target dates, and control of target date adherence, including appropriate sanctions to facilitate a high-quality and economically efficient production and circulation rhythm at all levels;

- the efficient labor-sharing cooperation between enterprises of varying sizes, structures, and socioeconomic character within the integration system;
- the control and coordination of production and of the movement of goods within the production and integration system with the aid of modern computer and information equipment;
- the role of the marketplace and of state regulation of the economy as well as collaboration between both of these entities in guiding agricultural production.

The creative transformation of experiences and accomplishments in Western countries in accordance with our social conditions, material possibilities, and specific conditions will place our agriculture not only in the position of being ever better able to master the tasks involved in supplying our population with foodstuffs and industry with agricultural raw materials and at the same time making a growing contribution toward the national economic total development, but will, at the same time, orient it toward those challenges which are emerging as a result of the all-European and German-German process of rapprochement. Toward this end, equal importance accrues to the thorough contemplation as to how to obtain the courage necessary to face the new and, particularly, the independence and self-responsibility of agricultural enterprises which has long been called for by our practitioners.

Unification Economic Imbalance Deplored

90GE0036D Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG
in German 24-25 Mar 90 p 12

[Article by Prof. Dr. Jens Reich, People's Chamber deputy for "Alliance 90," cofounder of New Forum: "The GDR Isn't Broke and Declaring Bankruptcy"]

[Text] First, unification was a distant dream, for many a nightmare. Then it came as a proposal of marriage, enticing and a little unsettling: Will I be able to hold my own in spite of my small dowry? Finally, it turned into a ride in an emergency vehicle with screaming sirens. The beginning of a precipitate birth.

In his well-defined language Willy Brandt made the change clear to us. At the beginning of the year he formulated to enthusiastic citizens of Rostock the idea of the growing together of what belongs together. Since then the train has been moving toward unity for him, and now the important thing is that no one comes to grief as a result. I cannot find it in me to like this new image. To whom is the role of remaining behind like a good citizen and waving goodbye to the train being assigned?

I also have a personal problem here. We missed the opportunity to build our own political culture and as a result we have had the thin brew of the West German party political landscape poured into our cups. And we

drained them willingly. It will have been our free majority decision. Air cannot be prevented from flowing into a vacuum. And still: It was the SPD [Social Democratic Party] that opened the race with a furious start. Like the childrens' game with the cry: Whoever gets home first! and right away he is 20 miles ahead. The SPD-East with over 50 percent and the SPD-West faced with a landslide election victory. That was the fata morgana to which the opposition reform alliance was sacrificed. It hurts me that it had to be the SPD, to which I felt so close over the decades, that pushed this turn of events.

I see the coup with the currency union and the other quick agreements as Kohl's attempt to cut the Gordian knot that no one else will be able to untangle. His argument is: 2,000 people are leaving every day, Gorbachev is frowning, and if we wait too long we will have votes in Ireland, Malta, and Monaco about German reunification. The situation calls for facts, then all the empty talk about social safety nets and fears will stop. So no more communities by treaty and confederative structures.

This is how many people may be calculating. And they are forgetting the customer. They will be surprised. There are already examples. Recently there was a rumor that school nurseries and school meals were to be discontinued (they are really expensive and often bad, but indispensable for many)—immediately there were demonstrations in the street. The same people who are filled with pan-German emotion when a speech at a political rally moves them will resist vociferously if the level of their present social possessions is affected, rents, pensions, savings accounts, the paid maternity year with the guarantee of a job, real estate which is contestable according to the law of the FRG. No one should give in to the illusion that the dismissals in the job market, with possibly millions of unemployed, can take place without enormous social upheaval. We are no longer living in the 1950's.

In my opinion the structural rehabilitation of our economy with a currency factually revalued upward is a Draconian remedy and I note that economists and bankers are of the same opinion. I am certainly surprised how quickly experts can have their opinion changed: on Monday they are still rigidly opposed to an immediate currency union, and on Thursday they are giving it their full support!?

The process of unification will not work without an independent constitution. Our present one is scrap paper; but a new one is needed, at least a draft, otherwise we are in fact negotiating only about entry under a few graciously granted special conditions. The basic law is unacquainted with the recent development in human rights and the ecological right of nature, and on the other hand our constitution contains a number of elements that we want to retain, and others whose rootings we cannot eradicate from our society without pain. The guarantee of property as a basic right, for example, may be well and good, and a great deal of injustice has been perpetrated against it, that has to be made good, such as the forcible expropriation of Jewish wealth before 1945.

But the consequences of the uncompensated expropriation of factories and of land reform cannot simply be pulled up like weeds, because there are two generations that have lived with a different order of property (whether they were asked or not), who kept the country alive and who have acquired moral rights of possession. People here were largely forbidden to acquire property, they were tricked into believing that they were participating in fictitious national property, in the means of production, and all they had was the social basic right to communal living space and to work. Everyone can picture for himself what it would mean for an elderly married couple to be transposed into the legal world of the basic law without being rewarded appropriately (not with charity) for their life's work.

We need a factory constitution, the codetermination of which is greater than what is legal in the FRG. I know that many people here are protesting. But as the result of decades of ecological arbitrariness and dictatorial planning we are marked and we also know that for the foreseeable future most people will have to deal with the same managers who have pushed through the indicator-based economy and have not given a damn about the workforce and the community. We do not want to see them in positions where they have the power to make serious decisions, in the manner of Western management floors, we want to have the right to make checks and decide whether they are still tolerable.

I am not one of those who lament the lost opportunity of two-state status. But unification is a difficult trade for me, and I want to be permitted to look the horse in the mouth, not just at its groomed coat. We have maintained German land for more than 40 years. If we had all run away, it would now be a desert or someone's latest colony. We have freed ourselves from our chains, while others were waiting for us and managed quite well without us. There were many people on the guest list in Schloss Huberstock or at the Leipzig Fair or at the official receptions during the state visit of 1987 and they saw no evil in Honecker. Nothing against diplomacy, freeing prisoners and business, but, please, let us not ride down the Siegesallee and plan to instruct the front line grunts how to behave in civilian life again. We are not the bankrupt who are declaring bankruptcy and are being saved from starvation. German unification will be an alliance between partners, and your investments are business like many other things, not tokens charity. In the long term it will be advantageous to you as well if the deals are fair and no one is put at a disadvantage.

What will Germany look like? I have a vision and yet I know what reality will be like. God, Germany could be such an enviable country! It lies in the middle of Europe, a rich country, with inhabitants who are industrious without being asked. It has a wonderful culture, a magnificent language, which many of its neighbors share, a language which tenaciously resists the conflict between indigenous inflexibility and cosmopolitan adaptation. Everyone would like to have a hospitable Germany in their midst, a crossroad of businesses and cultures; they

do not want us as a power center, but as a melting pot which can absorb all the contradictions and make them productive.

And had we not often botched this role of mediator many times in our history, at the time of the Hohensaufens, in the time of Emperor Charles IV, and have we not constantly botched it, when we made the transition from federal contrapuntal music to the centralized massing of chords, from Bach to Wagner as it were (these are extremely bold similes, I know), from the balance of interests to the exercise of power? Do we not possess all the requirements for this role, now, with 50 years of separate experience—some of them drenched in knowledge about France, England, Western Europe, the United States, while the others were confined to the smaller province, but still tens of thousands were educated in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, learned languages, met people and established friendships or families?

After almost 50 years of pseudo-socialism 16 million Germans are ready to return to the liberal ideas which had been crushed in Europe. They are able to contribute an experience that they share with the nations of Eastern Europe, right down to the roots of understanding, right down to an allusion in a conversation.

We are returning together from an involuntary expedition which failed, but which made us freer and enriched us spiritually. And, with our sweat-soaked shirts, we should not flay ourselves and then with spiritual third-degree burns be put on intravenous feeding. We are worth something, we have liberated ourselves. We have drafted elements of the social-political structure of the new millenium; we do not want to be received condescendingly and be sent off to the tween deck or the lower deck. We will have a voice where the future is concerned, which today's social and industrial model in the West will not come to grips with unchanged. Western Europe needs Eastern Europe, its people, its ideas and plans.

Of course I know that it is all hope. National fever is rampant at the moment, and most of us are not very concerned about the consequences of the intoxication of the wedding, a joyous uplifting or a hangover. But everyday reality will come, and with it the challenges that we Germans will also have to face, if humanity is to survive the 21st century. We should not forget our neighbors, with whom we have shared joy and suffering, common need, conflict and friendship.

A personal statement. In my mind I am still in the old days. At every step I catch myself in calculations in which "the GDR" plays a role, this country, in which I grew up, had family and friends and stayed there for reasons of youthful unconcern—"because you would still be able to elect to leave." Finally I was in the trap, like so

many others. Only the activists set themselves free, and only at the cost of scars and wounds. We stayed, made a living and made a virtue out of necessity. We tried to console ourselves: During the times of the Great Elector, citizens of Berlin were not able to visit the Piazza San Marco in Venice.

I still cannot grasp that freedom exists, that the state security forces and the bureaucracy are no longer tightening the shackles (many people believe in a conspiracy). The shackles were like tight bandages. When you undo them, the blood pours into the main arteries, and at first you collapse in a faint. Many people will have the same experience as myself: Should I go on as I have been, in the scientific work that I have pursued so diligently, not without talent, but which I chose in the final analysis as a buffer zone, free of Marxism-Leninism? Or should I strike out on a wild new beginning and at the age of 50 start what was barred to me at the age of 20? Writing, thinking, struggling? Or has my snail's shell grown to become part of me, will I drag it around with me to the end of my life?

I must admit that the bold decision would be easier if the GDR were to continue to exist. Its collapse came even more unexpectedly than the collapse of the system. And if even I, with some talent for writing and speaking, an active command of four languages and, for emergencies, an adequately crisis-resistant profession in computers in molecular genetics, if I am so insecure when faced with the parachute jump, how concerned must all those people be around me, whose job is one with their very existence and yet who will find themselves in a crisis as a result of the turnaround.

In many respects we probably appears dilettantish, child-like. Childrens' painting is clumsy, but it is uninhibited and surprisingly original. It should not be heedlessly ignored. The same with our political upheaval: It is also a chance for the FRG.

Wismut Uranium Prospects Summarized

90GE0034A East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 10-11 Mar 90 p 9

[Unattributed article: "Uranium, the Sun in Human Hands"]

[Text] The peaked domes of the Wismut trash heaps are imprinted like pyramids on the east Thuringian landscape around Ronneburg. They are hardly noticed by local residents, but for environmentalists they are a constant source of irritation, and often enough for strangers. Together with the shaft winding tower, they are visible from a long distance and are a symbol of the secrecy-surrounded GDR uranium mining industry.

Like no other branch of industry, Wismut has changed people and the landscape in the south of the GDR in the past 44 years. The Soviet-German Corporation (SDAG) practically ruled as a state within a state: with an actually

little-known board of directors, highly confidential figures on production and employment, acting across kreis and bezirk borders. Protected by its own security police command and controlled by its own Ministry for State Security administration, served by its own health-care unit supplied for many years by a store of its own.

With the democratic renewal, Wismut is also trying to bring an end to all the secret pettiness. Data and information are being made public, and it offers the observer—with a rather sobering effect—a picture of a modern mining operation which is looking at fundamental structural changes just as other factories and combines are. Its employees are feeling social pressures for the first time.

The old miner's greeting "Good Luck!" is still in our ear as we go down at double the speed of the elevator in the television tower. The speedy mine cage stops, clattering, at the 660 m (2,150 ft) level. We indicate our arrival to the computer with a punched metal mark in the miners' lamp.

The Drosen Mining Company is the most modern in the SDAG Wismut. It has been an independent operation for 10 years, and its 2,800 miners are working a uranium seam in the northeastern Ronneburg ore deposit. Over 500,000 cm of stone is excavated yearly, says graduate engineer Roland Stelzig, who has been the director in Drosen since the beginning.

After Chernobyl, the Taboos Were Unenforceable

Not only mining railroad engines, but also self-propelled conveyors and other equipment are hanging from the 380 volt trolley wires like electric buses. There is no more diesel noise, a contribution to environmental protection above the mine. Despite that, the miners' work is hard. At the workplace, the men are alone, two or three against the mountain. Light from spotlights, noise, dirt, and yet they all certainly enjoy this profession.

Rolf Beerhold, too, who excavates uranium ore with his brigade somewhere in between the 2,150 ft and 720 (2,350 ft) level. The trained toolmaker has been a miner for over 15 years, at first as a locksmith, and later after retraining, a miner. The money attracted the newlywed man—in the meantime, his crew has been among the top earners. Each man receives M 1,800 to M 2,000 cash. "But we did not want to stay miners just for that. It is not only hard, but it is also interesting and there is a lot of variety. Many people complain today about our privileges, but they do not know what it is like down here, and how shiftwork gets under the skin," believes the 35-year-old man. "Now we fear the future, too. What will

happen to Wismut? Management tells us that this operation stays. But the neighboring shaft is closing, and who can guarantee that reduced production will not also affect a few of us?"

People on the surface are concerned, too. How great is the actual radiation contamination? Is uranium mining a health danger, are increased risks of cancer or even genetic damage threatening? For decades, all statistical data was classified, which would have enabled the experts to make inferences on deposit sizes, productivity and ore concentration. And everyone knew that uranium for Soviet nuclear weapons came from Wismut....

"At last after Chernobyl, those taboos were dropped because even by then the military-strategic reasons did not matter any more, and today we mine exclusively for peaceful purposes," confirmed Wismut general director Horst Bellmann. "We wanted to publish the data, but Mittag and Stoph prevented it."

Mistrust is great, indeed on both sides. The citizens do not want to believe the comparatively harmless data, and have doubts about the numbers, documents and even the measuring equipment. Why else would everything have been kept secret so long? On the other hand, the experts are suspicious of the "amateur experts" and their "discoveries." Often enough they fired off in the Western media publications which were not serious. The way to one another is being sought with difficulty. The mine-shaft director goes to the citizens' forum at church, and the pastor comes to the mine....

Those expert findings are enlightening, overall. The spoil heaps give off no more radiation than the natural surroundings, because the material containing uranium is extracted from this rubble. The situation is different with the old burden from the Erzgebirg silver mines, where it was precisely the uranium-containing ore which was thrown on the spoil heaps. But that was not Wismut.

The cause of all the problems is the radioactive inert gas, radon. Radon is created in the staged decay of radium, and breaks down further into lead, bismuth, and polonium isotopes. Accumulated on microscopic dust particles, they can make their way into the lungs. So they are a danger, above all for miners underground. The famous Schneeberg sickness, a long-time puzzling lung cancer, may be caused in this manner.

This mechanism was just first discovered in the 1950's, and since then, technological countermeasures have been improved over and over—wet boring, wetting the rock after it is blasted loose, regular measurements at the individual work areas underground, and also a new separating technology which cannot produce any exhaust any more. Powerful ventilation in the mineshafts, which feels like a strong draft to us, prevents too high concentrations of radon. Measuring stations belonging to the State Office for Atomic Security and Radiation Protection, and the mine, watch over the entire area. Of the approximately 160 people who have recently fallen ill with lung cancer as a result of their work at Wismut, up

to 98 percent are miners who were already working underground in the 1940's and early 1950's. And information on daily cigarette consumption was not solicited in these cases.

Dr. Helmut Janke from the Wismut health care office insures us that even according to international standards, one does not have to be concerned with genetic defects. The statistics show no concentration, for example, of miscarriages, deformities, infant mortality or sterility among the miners or local residents. Estimating is difficult, however, because no one knows what the exact base data should be. No one knows how many hundreds of thousands of people went through Wismut in the early years....

Anywhere Standards Are Used, Something Is Rotten

"We are not a chocolate company, and wherever some data is at the allowable limit, something is rotten. Whether a standard is international or not, as scientists we must always attempt to keep risks as small as possible." This is the scientific skepticism speaking in Dr. Karl-Heinz Eife's radical point of view. The 55-year-old technical director for equipment in the Seelingstaadt processing factory has been working at Wismut for over 30 years. He was in the mining industry's Science and Technology Center for a long time, and now is in this large chemical factory in order to be present at the introduction of research results to computer-directed processing management of uranium processing. "We must also openly tell the public about our problems. For example, at the waste heaps there is the wind erosion which is spreading dust far across the area. This dust carries substances derived from radon. Or there is the outlet water which is still too heavily concentrated with sulfates, or the safe ultimate disposal of earlier mining areas. Only then will there be trust."

These are all additional concerns which Wismut must cope with. Three quarters of a billion marks should be invested by the end of this decade for natural rehabilitation measures. The prospects for that are not clear, though, because disarmament radically reduces the military need for uranium. In addition, the prime consumer Soviet Union is no longer prepared to bear the burden of supporting Wismut with millions. The seams are becoming unproductive, excavation is becoming more and more expensive. The long-range plan for energy in the GDR is one of the only question marks, and the competitive analysis of the world market is still very vague.

By the early 1980's at the latest, these developments had been foreseen by knowledgeable people who had specifically called for deep-rooted structural changes at Wismut. Of course, warnings faded away in the politburo and even the local SED [Socialist Unity Party of Germany] leadership. Dr. Eife knew it by the time the old party leadership was questioned, in which he participated as a member of the PDS [Party of Democratic

Socialism] arbitration commission. Now all the indicators show storms ahead for the undertaking with its 39,000 employees in the 18 mining, processing, machinery, supply, and transport companies. About 10,000 miners will be laid off in the next five years.

At his own request, Tilo Wetzel first took a peaceful leave of absence from his work, because the 32-year-old miner is involved in politics for the SPD [Social Democratic Party]. The party nominated its member in the Thuringian province committee for a place on the ballot list as a People's Chamber candidate which offers good prospects.

How Much Time Do The Politicians Have Left?

It is understandable that the young man does not leave his colleagues out in the cold in all the big politics. "Information from management was completely insufficient, the regulations on separation payments were not completely developed. That has contributed greatly to insecurity. We observed that planning concepts were missing. The union must make itself much stronger in any case." And in any case, the settlement of suitable follow-up industries must remain a state matter. "We definitely need unemployment insurance, but I cannot accept that unemployment numbers should grow by orders of magnitude. A right to work written in the constitution means less in my opinion than a national responsibility for job creation and retraining programs. In the Gera area, it would have to be oriented towards such traditional areas as machinery construction and the textile industry."

The PDS is developing similar proposals, as Dr. Wolfgang Meudert from the Gera district council says. But: "All the retraining and social security problems, which are so socially oriented and detailed, remain in question in a rash annexation to the Federal Republic. With the Wismut example, the problem of the entire country will become clear. We need time to place our truly social and ecological stamp on the market economy. In our opinion, an established right to work is a part of that, although not at any one given job."

In the meantime, a report to the council of ministers on the future of Wismut is being worked on under high pressure, the third in 10 months. It is the most complicated development stage by far for Wismut, as general director Bellmann granted, but definitely not without chances. Because there is still no alternative in the world to nuclear power, and the known reserves in Wismut reach beyond the year 2000.

"Restructured, Wismut could on the one hand continue to offer its traditional mining services. And indeed for domestic as well as foreign demands; we have learned enough in the past years," stated the deputy minister for heavy industry, Dr. Horst Richter. "On the other hand, through restructuring, some of the operations which no longer operate economically could rebuild into new lines, for machinery construction, for example, for pollution control equipment or through the sale of mining

know-how. It is conceivable that the previous sole shareholders, the GDR and the USSR, could offer a portion of their foreign interests."

It will surely be some time before the miners in the last factory find confidence in such concepts. It may be established, however, that even with all the problems, the time was never more favorable to make true the words of the Wismut-miner and later lyricist and dramatist from the 1950's, Horst Salomon: "Uranium, sun in human hands, you should never disgrace the countenance of the earth."

HUNGARY

Postelection Economic Possibilities Viewed

90CH0066A Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 31 Mar 90 p 66

[Article by economist Maria Zita Petshnig of the Financial Research Corporation staff: "Peacetime Economy"]

[Text] The new government has not even been formed, yet it has already won its first battle. For how else could one rate the fact that the executive directors of the IMF, in knowledge of the Constitutional Court's decision on rescinding the taxation of interest payments, have signed the loan agreement, after a delay of six months? The new leadership won confidence by letting the old Parliament cope with the contents of the agreement—consider the budget debate in December—and that was linked to the program of the old government (in other words, of the present one).

It is being said that the significance of the present IMF agreement lies not so much in its amount as in its role as a catalyst, in helping the country obtain other promised resources. Thus the new government will have a modest trousseau and, for a few months at least, will be spared the threat of external collapse. But what will happen thereafter? If we are unable—and it seems that we will be unable—to produce the promised and demanded results, will the cat-and-mouse game start anew? Will we again be making promises and attempting to present ourselves as credit-worthy? Will we perhaps experiment with yet another new government? Will the International Monetary Fund pretend to believe that we are merely experiencing temporary payment difficulties and will it help us to overcome them, while we agree to play—less rather than more successfully—the role the IMF expects of us? Will there then be furrowed brows and expressions of disappointment, with everything continuing as before, but under stricter conditions at best, while the national economy continues to decline? Obviously, such a policy is a dead-end street, along which we cannot and must not proceed further. We cannot, because of the growing burden. And we must not, because new solutions have to be found in the new situation that is evolving in world politics.

According to the 1990-92 plan, the servicing of Hungary's foreign debt will absorb between \$3.5 and \$4.0 billion a year. In relation to our annual merchandise export and net earnings from tourism, that will mean a debt-servicing rate of between 45 and 50 percent. (Many countries have had their debts rescheduled at much lower debt-servicing rates.) We will be lucky if we are able to meet even half of the \$1.5 billion interest payments due each year. If for no other reason, therefore, our foreign indebtedness will continue to rise. Moreover, this will happen in such a way that the domestic economy will not be able to enjoy even a penny of the rise of our indebtedness. Indeed, the withdrawal of income from the domestic economy will continue. Admittedly, this takes into account neither the "cash" surplus of imported functioning capital nor the restructuring of CEMA relations. The former might yield something, but the latter will only take away. Uncertainty is the only characteristic that the two have in common.

I do believe that the change of political regimes will liberate new energies, and the switch to a new economic system will be able to mobilize vast reserves, but I would caution everyone against overestimating them.

Unlike others, I do not categorically condemn the policies that the IMF and the World Bank have been applying to us so far. Being bound by those policies has helped to dismantle the post-Stalinist system. After all, the conditions for obtaining loans usually included reform measures that we would have had to introduce anyhow: the elimination of subsidies, the price system's liberalization, a reform of banking, development of a securities market, etc. But now there is a new situation: We must continue the dismantling of the old system and simultaneously build a new one. What we need now is a 180-degree turn, rather than a 90-degree one (earlier we were satisfied with even smaller turns).

For Central Europe a particular war period is now ending, and the foundations of a war economy and war-time control are collapsing. (Andras Brody estimates that the war economy accounted for about 30 percent of GNP.) But the situation in Central Europe now is worse than it was in Western Europe after World War II. There, on the one hand, the war did not suspend national

awareness and the market economy for 40 years, did not break up the basic microorganisms of social and economic life; on the other hand, the sense of liberation and the inspiring force of post-war peace prevailed. Moreover, Western Europe received \$13.9 billion in loans and aid from the end of the war through September 1947, and it also received the bulk of the \$13 billion distributed as Marshall Plan aid after 1947. All of this assistance jointly is estimated to be worth \$350 billion in today's currency. That was enough not only to clear away the rubble, but also to renew Western Europe's production base at the highest technical level of that period, which then led to incredibly rapid economic growth.

Our peace is different: The nation-states are just discovering one another, but their parallel economic structures rule out the possibility of mutual economic assistance, and their creditworthiness is practically nil. True, France too was in the same situation in 1947, and who knows how long it would have remained there had its creditworthiness been rated on the basis of traditional banking criteria. But the peacetime methods did not apply then, and I am convinced that they cannot apply now, either.

The programs of several parties proposed equity-for-debt swaps. Such proposals reflect the sound realization that the present practice of debt management cannot continue. But investors have not been very keen about such swaps so far. (Between 1983 and 1988, eight developing countries were able to reduce merely by \$13 billion their combined total foreign debt of several hundred billion dollars.) Moreover, the only way of entering this market is for the country concerned to declare itself insolvent, accepting all the consequences of doing so.

Thus, it would be better to think ahead and to conclude new agreements with the developed world. Hungary could take the initiative in this, and in joint action by Europe's new poor countries as well. We need a new Bretton Woods Agreement, a new Monetary Fund, and a new International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The entire world could gain from the reconstruction of Central Europe, for that could trigger a new economic boom. If the region is left to its own resources, however, the entire world could plunge into a depression of unfathomable debt.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Managua Hospital Funding Reported Shaky

90GE0056C East Berlin DIE ANDERE in German
No 10, 29 Mar 90 p 12

[Article by Hannes Bahrmann: "Who Will Cover Future Costs of Carlos [as published] Marx Hospital, GDR's Important Solidarity Project?"]

[Text] The paint is already peeling off a bit; it probably was intended for the damp and cold November days at home. Yet the name "Carlos [as published] Marx Hospital," continues to be clearly visible from far away. In the vibrating heat, three limp flags are hanging from the poles: black-red-gold with emblem, blue-white-blue, and red-black. The banners are nowadays the cause of quarrels and worries. Since the Sandanistas lost the elections, their red-black flag has no place here, grumbles the Nicaraguan hospital administrator. The patients, on the other hand, are interested in how long the flag of the "Germans" will continue to fly over them.

The sick are worried about whether they can in the future count on the now-countrywide famous health service. Daily, some 700-800 patients are crowding the doctors' offices. News of the treatment by the Germans has made the rounds and a doctor appointment has long been become a form of cherished privilege. Some 850 patients a month, with an average stay of six days, are treated in the hospital's 220 beds as inpatients. The GDR doctors perform an average of 350 major surgeries a month and deliver 250 babies, estimates medical director Dr. Kurt Lobodasch. The hospital is a project of the Free German Youth [FDJ]. Supported by the Solidarity Committee, the request of the Nicaraguan health system for the establishment of a mobile hospital was granted in 1985. Thus the central unit and tents were set up in Barrio Xolotlan of Managua's sixth district, which is the poorest section of the capital. Originally planned as a barrio hospital, today it serves 350,000 people, i.e., one-tenth of the country's population. Since 1985, almost 500,000 patients received all types of ambulatory treatment here and 11,000 more had surgery. Over the years, the tents gave way to sturdy houses and the field hospital to magnificent operating rooms; the complex consists of 20 individual bungalows. The patients are treated in general medicine, pediatry, surgery, and gynaecology.

Dr. Lobodasch is a gynaecologist at the district hospital of Bad Frankenhausen and now heads a team of 20 doctors, 25 nurses, 24 technicians from the GRD and 400 local workers. Of course, the Germans design the work program, the medical director admits. However, administrative matters are already handled by locals. The complete changing of the guard was agreed to a long time ago—not as a result of the defeat of the Sandanistas at the polls.

Lobodasch is proud of the five medical specialists who will complete their training these days; three of them want to continue their work at the Carlos Marx hospital. In addition, 60 nurses complete their training at the hospital each year.

Lobodasch leaves it to others to judge whether or not his hospital is an object of prestige. It is the only hospital in the city built after the July 1979 overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship, and it is hard to imagine that the health care system can do without it.

The director sees its advantage over other hospitals in the stable supply of medicines as well as the constant presence of technicians of all kinds who can remedy small and large problems quickly. This, of course, is necessary because all the technical equipment is "Made in the GDR," hence different from the local standard. That also means that, e.g., the supply of energy has been resolved in an unusual way: the hospital cannot be linked to the Nicaraguan network because at 50 hertz and 110 volts, all equipment is first rectified and then chopped before reaching the socket. Why the buildings made from asbestos-cement slabs were constructed without natural cross ventilation is a question not only competent visitors to the hospital keep asking. Almost all buildings have interior corridors preventing natural ventilation. The glass-fiber wall-paper which hermetically seals the double windows and doors which open toward the inside with three folded joints, turns—at local temperatures—the rooms into saunas which require expensive airconditioning. The spacious complex has swallowed some 40 million marks in donations. All new operating rooms, however, were built by the Nicaraguan Ministry of Health. (That, however, ate up the entire investment volume of the ministry.) Also, Nicaragua also provides 15 percent of all the medications. In addition, Nicaragua is assuming the costs of all labor and administrative expenditures and pays for gasoline, electricity, and water. However, there is agreement that Nicaragua is in no position to take over in the foreseeable future, once the GDR personnel have left. Normally, the contract between the FDJ and the health ministries of the two countries would expire at the end of 1990. This would have been followed by a five-year transition period.

The changes that have taken place on this and the other side of the ocean suggest that the patients' fear is not unrealistic. What is going to happen then? It currently costs about \$6,000 a day to operate the hospital. Experts believe that these costs are simply too high and must be minimized. This requires construction changes—connection of electric power to the national network, using sun collectors to reduce costs, natural ventilation to replace expensive airconditioning equipment—one-for-one cuts in personnel and beds as well as income from services to be rendered by technical personnel to other public health facilities.

However, even if a slow reduction of costs were accomplished, the complex can only be maintained with the help of outside funding. In the GDR, action has already started on "Save the Carlos Marx." The project has been instigated by former doctors, nurses, and technicians of the hospital. The health ministry in Berlin has taken up first contacts with partners in Sweden and Spain. Also, Bonn's diplomatic representation in Managua has indicated that a joint commitment to save the hospital is conceivable. But, of course, nobody is as yet ready to confirm such pledges. The Carlos Marx Hospital should be a good test of the concrete involvement of all political parties and movements. Especially after

the election defeat of the Sandanistas it is out of the question to demand that the GDR Solidarity assistance to Nicaragua be discontinued, as a representative of the Democratic Awakening [DA] told DIE TAGESZEITUNG. The argument that, with strong U.S. assistance, the Nicaraguan economy would be able to recover without GDR funds is definitely wrong.

The rapid withdrawal of personnel would unquestionably be followed by the hospital's collapse. Before all technological equipment is converted to U.S. standards—and a strong warning is in order here with regard to the generous mood of the United States—the sands of time will have covered this very important project. For the precise reason that, in view of its weak foreign exchange position, the GDR has installed incompatible equipment, it remains our role to ensure the long-term contractual transition through actions, publicity and pressure on the responsible parties.

HUNGARY

Soros Foundation Awards, Spring 1990

25000700B Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG
in Hungarian 6 Apr 90 p 22

["Hungarian Academy of Sciences-Soros Foundation—Spring Decisions"]

[Text] The Hungarian Academy of Sciences-Soros Foundation Committee awarded the following scholarships and support at its March session held in Budapest:

General Competition Awards

Recipient	Purpose	Amount in Forints
Iren Vaszko*	House in Endrod	20,000
Bihar Literary Society*		100,000
Szilvia Granasztói Creative Workshop		200,000
KLTE Philosophy Specialized College		250,000
Dr. Miklos Kazmer and associates	Dictionary of old Hungarian family names	170,000
Walter Endrei and associates	Research in technical innovation	100,000
Budapest Association of the Handicapped		200,000
Multi-Media Theater*		47,000
Katalin Burai*	Examination of children of Gypsy origin	50,000
Jozsef Lele, Jr.	7,000-forint-per-month scholarship for two years for collection and research work	168,000
Jeno Barabas and Nandor Gilyen	Architecture of village in the Danube bend; 8,000 forints per person per month for one year	192,000
Kisvarda Theater	Organizing a festival	500,000

General Competition Awards (Continued)

Recipient	Purpose	Amount in Forints
State Institute of the Handicapped	Artisan workshop	212,000
Gypsy Cultural Association, Pecs	People's academy	70,000
Lorand Eotvos University of Sciences [ELTE], Social Studies Research, Philosophical Education Continued Training Center	Course	40,000
Primavera Amateur Ballet Group		200,000
Janos Vitez Teacher Training Academy	Camping	100,000
Dr. Ilona Bodrogi	Examination of geodetic phenomena	20,000
Hungarian Ornithological Society	Camping	288,000
Imre Gaal Studio, Budapest	Art supplies	210,000
KJK Minerva Editorial Office	Publication of the samizdat "Naplo"	240,000
Mrs. Pacsu, Sari Fodor	Researching the Franciscan Cloister of Palota	24,000
JPTE [not further expanded] Uralist Seminary		121,000
Peter Veres Gymnasium, Budapest	Participation at youth conference	138,000
Mrs. Dr. Akos Kiss, Dr. Eva Kigyos	Rehabilitation of children struck by polio	194,000
Dr. Csaba Karossy	Sociographic research	300,000
Monfod MEOSZ [not further expanded] Organizing Committee		100,000
JPTE literary history department	"Holocaust in the Arts" international conference	250,000
Dr. Csaba Ratay*	Family help movement	50,400
Attila Jozsef Gymnasium, Budapest	International conference of high school students	115,000
National Association of Persons with Kidney Disease		250,000
Koszeg Speech Improvement Elementary School		380,000
"Remembering the settlement of Kuns," Kisujszallas		50,000
ELTE BTK [not further expanded] philosophical department group	Philosophers' meeting	200,000
Miklos Radnoti Gymnasium, Dunakeszi	Public education program	100,000
Mrs. Dr. Pal Hessky	Volume on linguistics	46,000
Kazincbarcika Amateur Actors' Festival		200,000

General Competition Awards (Continued)

Recipient	Purpose	Amount in Forints
The history of thermodynamics	Conference	100,000
Jokai Circle Association, Papa	Commemorative exhibit	40,000
Foundation for Free Trade Unions	"Citizen information campaign for free elections"	6,250,000
Lajos Lowy, Peter Kovacs	Expenditures related to the research of the names of Jewish martyrs	150,000
Eva Somogyi, Peter Hanak	Commemorative volume	200,000
Andrea Fodor, Zsolt Kovats	Preparing the map of Transylvania	200,000
Arvisura (formerly Study) Theater		1,500,000
ELTE BRK folklore department		100,000
Dora Maurer	Audiovisual course *	15,000
Hungarian Philosophical Society	Scientific symposium	100,000
Judit Fridli and her working group	Research concerning the legal status of psychiatric patients	448,000

Entries marked with an asterisk have received awards before.

Decisions Rendered By the Literary Board of Trustees

Awards

Writer Peter Nadas	Gyula Krudy Award
Poet Otto Orban	Sandor Weores Award
Writer Gyorgy Raba	Dezso Kosztolanyi Award

Scholarships

Writer Gabor Albert	
Poet Imre Babics	
Poet Laszlo Bertok	
Poet Ferenc Buda	
Poet Gyoza Ferenc	
Poet Anna Kiss	
Writer Laszlo Krasznahorkai	
Critic Csaba Karolyi	
Writer Zsuzsa Rakovszky	

The amount of the awards is 250,000 forints. The scholarships amount to 10,000 forints per month for one year.

Support Awarded to Social Organizations

Recipient	In Kind	Amount in Forints
INDEX News and Press Service		100,000

Support Awarded to Social Organizations (Continued)

Recipient	In Kind	Amount in Forints
Newspaper called SHORTAGE	Photocopying machine, telefax	200,000
Association of Christian Intellectuals	Photocopying machine	
Nograd Village Association		385,000
GALA Magazine	Computer, photocopying machine	
Kozosnagyharsany Circle To Preserve Traditions		200,000
New Homeland Partnership (Hungarian Chinese Friendly Society)	Typewriter with Chinese characters	
KECSKEI HIREK	Computer	
Hungarian Henry George Society	Photocopying machine, tape recorder	
Fot Children's City Friendly Circle	Photocopying machine	
Hungarian Tourist Society		200,000
Kecskemet Family Therapy Society		238,000
Editorial Office of VILA-GOSSAG		1,500,000
REPLICA social science periodical		400,000
Girl Scout Association, Godollo	Photocopying machine	100,000
Pecel Mutual Aid Society	Photocopying machine	100,000
National Higher Education Interest Representation Association	Photocopying machine	
Scouting team, Mariaremete		150,000
Democratic League of Independent Trade Unions		1,016,000
Association of Hungarian Friends of Nature	collection of maps	310,000
Hasomer Hacair (Jewish youth meeting)		300,000

The purchase of in kind support will take place only if the duty free status of the Soros Foundation is settled.

Entries marked with an asterisk have received awards before.

Music Awards

Recipient	Purpose	Amount in Forints
Laszlo Kertesz *	Student Opera	100,000
Zsaratnok Ensemble *		100,000
Attila Remenyi *	Scholarship	72,000
Budapest Old Music Forum		200,000
Bekes-Tarhos Friendly Circle	Master course	200,000

Music Awards (Continued)

Recipient	Purpose	Amount in Forints
Budapest Singers' School		300,000
Ferenc Liszt Cultural Center, Sopron		200,000
Mrs. Nagy, Agnes Komor, Peter Varnai	Scholarship, study in music history	120,000
Debrecen Branch of the Ferenc Liszt Academy of Music		250,000
Ferenc Liszt Mixed Choir, Veszprem		100,000
KOTA [not further expanded] Szolnok County Organization	International Meeting of Boys' Choirs	100,000
Miskolc, County Children's City	Cultivating children's musical talent	100,000
Jozsef Kozak	Study in music	60,000
Academy Brass Quintette		300,000
Zoltan Kodaly Specialized Music High School, Debrecen	Third National Solfege Competition	100,000
Pecs Educators' House Chamber Choir		200,000
Ferenc Sebo	Scholarship and costs for one year	170,000
Lajos Czovek	Scholarship to gather folk songs	72,000
Leila Rasonyi, Erika Mayer	Concerts	50,000
Janos G. Fancsali	Scholarship	100,000
Hungarian Organization of Jeunesses Musicales		400,000
Mrs. Czidra, Klara Bodza, Katalin Paksa	Scholarship and costs for one year	175,000
Ferenc Liszt Academy of Music	Foreign master courses	450,000
Ferenc Erkel Chamber Orchestra		50,000
Debrecen Reformed Church College Kantus		300,000
Tucsok Service (Andras Janosi)		100,000
Cantemus Children's Choir, Nyiregyhaza		300,000
Erzsebet Szilagyi Women's Choir		250,000
Armada Percussion Ensemble 180 Group		300,000
MTA Musical Sciences Institute	Conference	100,000
International Folk Music Council	Symposium	100,000
Affetti Musicali Ensemble		150,000
ELTE Teacher Academy Choir Singing Ensemble		250,000

Music Awards (Continued)

Recipient	Purpose	Amount in Forints
Nyiregyhaza Specialized High School on Arts		100,000
Tatabanya Cultural Center	Sixth International Jazz Camp	100,000
Ferenc Laszlo	Research in the science of music	100,000

Entries marked with an asterisk have received awards before.

Creative Arts Competition Awards

Recipient	Purpose	Forints
Pal Gerber, Gabor Gerhes, Balazs Kicsiny, Gyorgy Kungl	Exhibition catalog	150,000
Attila Kovacs, architect, creative artist		80,000
Pecs Gallery	Poster exhibit	150,000
Obuda Cellar Gallery		100,000
Janos Sugar	Exhibition catalog	100,000
Nina Czegledy-Nagy	Video documentation	100,000
Miklos Erdelyi Bequest		100,000
Gyula Gulyas, sculptor	Exhibition catalog	100,000
El Kazovszkij, painter	Exhibition catalog	100,000
Laszlo Feher, painter	Catalog	200,000
Art gallery	Catalog for the Danish-Hungarian artists' exhibit	200,000
Szekesfehervar King Stephan Museum	Andras Beck exhibit	400,000
Szekesfehervar King Stephan Museum	Sandor Altorjai retrospective exhibit	300,000
Szekesfehervar King Stephan Museum	The "Substitute Thirties" exhibit	150,000

Social Composition of Small Entrepreneurs Analyzed

25000695D Budapest HETI VILAGGAZDASAG in Hungarian 31 Mar 90 pp 72-74

[Article by Tibor Kuczi and Agnes Vajda: "Who Has Capital in What?"]

[Text] It is not the money—capital—but educational achievement, age, and a favorable family environment that characterize Hungary's new entrepreneurs. Based on a joint research project conducted by the Labor Affairs Research Institute and the Central Statistical Office [KSH] in 1988, the authors of this article asked 4,000 Hungarian entrepreneurs what kind of social fiber has produced Hungary's entrepreneurs thus far.

Virtually all political groupings assign an important role to entrepreneurs today. According to party programs, it

is the task of independent persons to bring the Hungarian economy into motion, and their involvement is needed so that the market will become organized in place of the bureaucratic integration that is falling apart. In other words, according to the party programs, entrepreneurs are the lead actors in the change in the economic model that is soon to come, at least theoretically, according to expectations, because the national bourgeoisie that is so necessary for the transformation barely exists today, and it is only now that it must take shape, parallel with the development of market institutions.

We receive information daily about the birth of the old and the new elite: Enterprise and cooperative assets are becoming private property at a rapid pace; we are learning the names of new, successful large entrepreneurs and forgetting the old ones, like Adam Angyal and Ede Horvath. The high bourgeoisie is taking shape.

On the other hand, one hears very little about small and medium-sized entrepreneurs, even though they are the ones who constitute the independent majority, and who may become a significant part of the future middle class. Who are they who decide to take the "great leap": the ones who leave their workplaces and risk their existence and their family peace? Is there some condition related to origins, to educational achievement, that is necessary to acquire this "courage"? In a statistical sense, what provides a chance for becoming an entrepreneur? Capital inherited from parents? Or does the mere fact that there was once an independent person in the family suffice? Or, is it possible that sheer will would suffice in becoming an entrepreneur?

According to the assessment, today's typical entrepreneur is a young male between the ages of 30 and 45. He is educated, and in general some kind of professional career is behind him. Persons younger than 30 years and persons older than 60 have twice and six to seven times less chance of becoming entrepreneurs, respectively, than those between the ages of 30 and 45.

The absence of those below the age of 30 is explained by the fact that before a person becomes an entrepreneur he must go through a more or less 10-year period of accumulation: It appears that this much time is needed for the acquisition of the financial and non-financial capital, such as the clientele, contacts, and familiarity with the specialized market. On the other hand, the low ratio of older persons may be due to the fact that entry and exit in the entrepreneurial field are highly intensive. For example, 30 percent of the small tradesman and small merchant personnel—not counting employees—changes each year. The older ones gradually dropped out of this whirlpool during the decade of the eighties. Besides their age, this may be explained by the fact that their expertise, connections, and adaptive ability are tied to the "old" economic establishment; they learned to coexist with that.

Entrepreneurial careers are dominated by men. Within state enterprise and public institution workplaces the ratio of males to females is 50-50, while only one-third of independent entrepreneurs are female. A majority of women—60 percent—are active in traditionally female

occupations (boutiques, hospitality industry), and only between 15 and 23 percent of the women occupy managerial-entrepreneurial positions.

How well educated Hungarian entrepreneurs are is remarkable. The ratio of those who have not acquired some kind of trade is less than 10 percent. At the same time, 40 percent of the Hungarian populace which earns an income falls into this category. Half of the entrepreneurs have graduated from high school, one-fifth of them have acquired a diploma. This educational composition is not much different from that of Hungarian white collar workers.

High level educational accomplishments truly appreciated in value during the eighties. Mostly educated persons joined the entrepreneurial forms that started at the beginning of the decade and were licensed at that time, such as the economic work collective [GMK], the civil law association [PJT], and the small cooperative. The leaders of these organizations are particularly qualified. These changes also resulted in the elevation of the educational level in the more traditional forms of entrepreneurship, such as small trade and retail trade.

The large number of entries and exits shows a definite trend. Those who exit are older and less educated, while others who enter are young and well educated. A higher level of education also has a higher economic value than the Hungarian average, because in the course of their careers, entrepreneurs endeavored to acquire knowledge for which utility was the sole criterion. Frequently such knowledge is not even subject to formal recognition. Two-thirds of those questioned have some kind of professional training, half of them have several trades. Twenty percent of the independent persons have acquired three or more professional qualifications.

Indexes showing levels of educational achievement and the endeavor to acquire professional qualification(s) indicate that within the evolving Hungarian small and middle bourgeoisie, professional knowledge may be expected to become the most important organizing characteristic. Even thus far, entrepreneurial ventures have been based upon some kind of special knowledge, on experience gained during shorter or longer periods spent at state enterprises. And this tendency may be expected to continue in the future.

The high educational level of independent persons suggests a favorable family background: Only about one-fourth or one-fifth of the present entrepreneurs come from lower social strata, i.e. families where the fathers were trained, unskilled, or agricultural workers. Most of the parents of entrepreneurs belong to the well situated middle class. A generous one-quarter of the fathers are high school graduates or holders of diplomas, while 58 percent consist of skilled or white collar workers. The number of fathers who themselves pursued independent enterprise is not too high, it reaches only a 16-percent level.

Data pertaining to the descent of leaders and members of the intelligentsia on the one hand, and of entrepreneurs on the other, shows a surprising parallel. The stratum that created both groups is more or less the same, meaning that in Hungary more or less the same people

become entrepreneurs as those who become leaders and members of the intelligentsia. A similar result is shown by comparing the descent data of entrepreneurs and of persons having fashionable industrial occupations.

Since factors of demography, descent, and education strongly define the chances of a person becoming an entrepreneur in Hungary, the chances of members of groups in a less favorable position from this standpoint—the young, females, the uneducated, and persons from lower social strata—are not too great for becoming entrepreneurs. In other words, the social selectivity mechanisms that have evolved which have thus far determined the order by which one acquired a diploma and filled positions also regulate the chances of becoming independent. It is noteworthy that in this selection process the question of whether a person does or does not have capital plays a subordinate role. In today's crisis economy, certain amounts of capital were created by way of severance payments and new start subsidies. Theoretically, these amounts would be sufficient to become independent, nevertheless this is not the source from where entrepreneurial ventures start.

This also explains the fact that within the selection process the entrepreneurs' family background, i.e. the significance of the parents' independence, has faded. One-third of the parents of small tradesmen and retail merchants during the seventies were themselves independent. The shop, the store, the trade was handed down from father to son. In the eighties, however, this trend was broken with the emergence of group entrepreneurial forms, and the entrepreneurial background lost its earlier significance with respect to the children becoming independent. As we have stated before, a high educational level took the place of the parents' entrepreneurial background, and even the lifelong commitment to a single trade was exchanged for acquiring several trades, preferably on the advance foundation of having acquired a high school degree or a diploma. On the other hand, to

acquire such credentials, small entrepreneur parents do not necessarily provide the best social fiber. All of this does not mean that the selective role played by an entrepreneurial family background has completely ceased to exist, of course. In regard to entrepreneurs, the ratio of independent fathers is even higher today than in the average population earning an income, but it is characteristic that the ratio of independent parents is highest even today in the more traditional entrepreneurial forms, such as in small trade and retail trade.

The entrepreneurial stratum itself is also highly stratified. Members of one of the clearly recognizable groups have been working independently for 10-20 years. The way the small tradesmen and retail merchants in this group conduct their business, as well as their ambition, shows that they are not entrepreneurs in the classic sense of that term, i.e. they do not endeavor to achieve a significant increase in their capital, they have no inclination to expand and to change. Instead they want to preserve their clientele in the future. This group may also constitute the core of small entrepreneurship in the future.

Sharply distinguished from the former group are the leaders of group entrepreneurial ventures. These are educated, ambitious people—in one or another entrepreneurial form the ratio of holders of diplomas is as high as 50 percent—their abilities are in part managerial, and in part entrepreneurial and innovative. These persons may form the core of the future middle bourgeoisie.

Members of group entrepreneurial ventures constitute the third group of entrepreneurs. This group is highly heterogeneous. One finds among them entrepreneurial partners, just as there are persons who, from a practical standpoint, perform employee functions. These functions are likely to be more clearly delineated in the future. After having acquired some capital and some entrepreneurial experience, part of this group may become independent, while the other part may be transferred into a real employee status.

Distribution of Small Entrepreneurs in 1988 According to Father's Social Group

	Subordinate Leader	White Collar Worker	Skilled Worker	Unskilled Worker	Agricultural Worker	Independent Farmer	Tradesman, Merchant	Total
Longtime small tradesman	8.3	6.7	27.2	20.4	6	9.3	22.1	100
New small tradesman	8.7	13	32.9	17.7	10.4	5.6	11.7	100
Longtime retail merchant	14.8	9.7	21.4	14.1	10.4	6	23.6	100
New retail merchant PJT	9.8	17	30.3	15.9	7.1	4.5	15.4	100
GMK leader	16.3	26.1	25.7	10.1	6.6	6.2	9	100
Head of an industrial service provider specialized group	20.6	18.6	28.6	14.7	8	3.3	6.2	100
Head of small cooperative	20.3	24.1	26.9	12.2	5.7	3.7	7.1	100
Member of an entrepreneurial group	15	15.9	34.7	17.6	7.2	4.2	5.4	100
Total	13.4	15.8	30.3	16.3	7.5	5.4	11.3	100
Under age 60 and white collar	4.9	28.1	22.9	16.4	11.2	0.5	7	100

Distribution of Small Entrepreneurs in 1988 According to Father's Social Group (Continued)

	Subordinate Leader	White Collar Worker	Skilled Worker	Unskilled Worker	Agricultural Worker	Independent Farmer	Tradesman, Merchant	Total
Under age 60 and pursues fashionable trade*	2	15.9	34.6	24.7	14.5	4.2	4.1	100
Total urban*	2.3	15.7	23.8	23.5	14.3	12.6	7.8	100

*Source: Social mobility and prestige, KSH 1986

Distribution of Small Entrepreneurs in 1988 According to Father's Educational Level (in percentages)

	Less Than 8 Grades	8 Grades	Industrial School	High School Graduate	Higher Education	Total
Longtime small tradesman	36.5	21.8	26.7	8.6	6.4	100
New small tradesman	23.7	29.4	25.9	11.9	9.1	100
Longtime retail merchant	27.9	19.4	25.6	16.2	10.9	100
New retail merchant PJT	22.5	25.7	23.1	16.6	12.1	100
GMK leader	17.7	20.8	18.4	18.8	24.3	100
Head of an industrial service provider specialized group	20	20.7	24	18	17.3	100
Head of small cooperative	13.6	25.9	20.5	18.4	21.6	100
Member of an entrepreneurial group	15.9	27.6	26.9	16.2	13.4	100
Total	21.5	25.5	24.7	14	13.4	100

Small Entrepreneurs' "Mobility" in 1988

	Average Number of Trades	Average Number of Occupations	Average Number of Workplaces	Number of Years as Entrepreneur
Longtime small tradesman	1.8	1.9	3.3	14
New small tradesman	1.8	2.5	3.7	3.7
Longtime retail merchant	1.8	2.8	3.8	12.6
New retail merchant PJT	1.7	2.9	3.7	2.8
GMK leader	1.9	2.9	4	3.9
Head of an industrial service provider specialized group	1.9	3.5	4.5	3.7
Head of small cooperative	1.9	3.7	4.4	2.8
Member of an entrepreneurial group	1.7	2.6	3.9	3.1
Total	1.8	2.7	3.8	5.2

ROMANIA

Marginalization of Youth in 'Society of Adults'

90BA0083A Bucharest TINERETUL LIBER
in Romanian 8, 9, 10, 13 Feb 90

[Article by V. Pasti, A. Musetescu, and G. Scortan: "The 'Society of Adults' and the Marginalization of Youth"]

[8 Feb pp 1, 3]

[Text] We live in a society of adults in which youth is a marginalized class. Which means that any allocation or

distribution of resources, status, advantages, etc. between young people and adults is as a rule going to be to the detriment of the former. (There are, of course, exceptional situations, but they do not disprove this general situation).

Youth does not react to this marginalization as such, because it is not obvious or perceived as such by young people, either in its entirety or in its deepest characteristics. What becomes visible in daily life is only a series of specific problems which various categories of young people perceive as disadvantages, inequalities, or sources of frustration, without realizing the connections between them or their depth.

The revolution, in which the youth played a paramount role, paved the way for expressing such problems and frustrations, and fostered the hope that they will be speedily resolved through the administrative and judicial means at the disposal of the state. However, neither the marginalization nor the problems that it generates are merely the result of accident or political error, lack of interest or consideration, nor of conjunctural socioeconomic and cultural situations. If things were that simple, then solving the problems of youth would depend only on the goodwill of those in power, or on the capability of young people to exercise fairly strong pressures. At present, these two conditions are met, but the problems that can be solved with their help are far from coinciding with the real problem of marginalization. For example, cancelling the obligatory highschool uniforms was easy, but providing jobs for highschool graduates is still an unfulfilled desideratum.

Marginalization also defines a certain relationship between youth and society which cannot be changed through administrative measures. There exist objective social mechanisms that generate it. Some of its components are unavoidable, because they stem from the condition of young people not being sufficiently mature at certain ages. Others, however, stem from the manner in which society is organized, and its effects can be partially removed or attenuated.

Consequently, the marginalization of youth cannot be completely eliminated, at least not that part of it which is anchored in biological facts and the requirements of education. However, it can be kept under control and reduced to a minimum by continuous social practices consciously geared to that objective.

Such a social practice must know what its goal is and how to go about it. In other words, it must identify its objective and select its means. Moreover, it must be rooted in substantive information, systematically culled and scientifically processed, and must act consistently, for the long term, and in relation to future objectives. In one word, such a social practice must be based on a coherent youth policy.

What Is a Youth Policy

By asserting that a youth policy is needed, we realize that we are opening the door to question marks and even suspicion. First of all, because the idea of a single, uniform youth policy seems to deviate from the basic conditions of a pluralistic democracy. Politics are the domain of the parties which, in their programs, feature points concerning the present and future situation of youth. Consequently, we should be talking about several youth policies.

Moreover, young people themselves have some reservations about politics when it comes to their own problems. The majority of youth organizations that mushroomed immediately after the revolution with a view to promoting the rights of youth and demand solutions to

some of their daily problems, are trade union-type organizations, which overtly declare their lack of interest in politics. And trying to rally all the young people in one organization is, of course, utopia. Youth, a very heterogeneous class, cannot provide the social basis for a political party, because their issues do not span the entire range of major issues of the society. Other objections can probably be added even to the idea of mapping out a youth policy. Nevertheless, such a policy is necessary.

The issues of the young cannot be resolved in the absence of a coherent system of social actions which: 1) takes into account the diversity and linkage between them; 2) sets them in order of priority and importance; 3) rationally and efficiently allocates resources and means; 4) monitors the effects of the various actions and is able to handle unforeseen implications.

Since such a system of actions is based on one option—that of reducing the marginalization of youth—it constitutes a policy. This option is supported by moral, political, ideological, and other considerations.

In view of the fact that, once the option is adopted, the main directions of action depend from then on on reality—the real condition of youth at a given moment—and not on options adopted in other areas, the youth policy becomes coherent.

The strategic materialization of the central option of the youth policy generates, in relation to the real condition of youth in Romanian society, three major objectives for such a policy:

- The demarginalization of the youth. This objective proceeds from the reality that at present young people occupy an inferior position in practically all socioeconomic, cultural, and political areas. This marginalization is extremely extensive as a result of the previous policy, which used this as a means of obtaining resources for carrying out socioeconomic projects specific to the dictatorship.
- Preventing the emergence of additional forms, areas, and aspects of youth marginalization. In the absence of a youth policy consciously aimed at counteracting them, developments along those lines are unavoidable.

a) They may appear as the unintended results or side effects of correct solutions, taken according to criteria that do not take into consideration the youth and its main socioeconomic problems.

b) They may also appear as an intentional outcome of certain political options that set the criteria or stages of resolving social problems to the disadvantage of the youth. For example, one of the strategies belonging to this category is to rationally and credibly justify a great marginalization of the youth at present to create resources for allegedly better dealing with youth problems in the future.

Such trends and implications may emerge because the objectives of the youth policy are not viewed as obligatory criteria for the solutions offered by various policies. Moreover, when resources are limited—as in Romania's case—maintaining or creating situations ignoring the interests of youth makes it possible to free resources for other purposes.

—Neutralizing the phenomena of youth marginalization generated by the decentralization option.

Decentralizing and increasing the autonomy of the various communities, social institutions, enterprises, etc. will permit and encourage the proliferation of unique forms of marginalization of youth. They will illustrate the economic, social, and cultural particularities of these micro-groups and of the balance of forces within them. For that reason, they cannot be controlled or averted at a central level, through administrative measures or laws. Moreover, any attempt to deal with it by such means is not only useless, but may even become a source of legitimization of the old model and of youth marginalization based on centralism.

What this means is that a prejudice must be dispelled. So far we have been tempted to consider the problem of marginalization and, inevitably, of strategies to neutralize it as a relation between the youth in its entirety and the state as the unique source of solutions. The decentralization and elimination of the paternalistic model of state intervention in solving youth problems require a new vision of the strategies of a youth policy.

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[Text] As a system of actions designed to reduce and prevent the marginalization of the youth in all the areas, the youth policy is directed, at least in this initial stage, toward the following major objectives:

The Economic Demarginalization of Youth

This objective is of the highest priority, because the economic inferiority of youth in relation to adults is the main means of maintaining and deepening its inferiority in other social areas. It is also by far the most difficult issue to solve, because it greatly depends on the limited material and financial resources of the society.

The economic marginalization of youth is not uniform. It differs from one category of youth to another, in keeping with both the characteristics of the young people themselves (such as their occupation), and the characteristics of the social group to which they belong.

a) The economic inferiority of young people in the educational system (students of various levels) is generated by the fact that they do not have their own income. The immediate and brutal result of this situation is that they are subject to the decisions, options, aspirations, and ideas of the social institutions (the family, school, church, economic units, state, etc.) which support them.

The objective of the youth policy in this respect is to reduce their dependence by creating alternatives. Such alternatives must not conform to the interests of certain institutions, but to the aspirations of the young people.

b) The economic inferiority of working youth is generated by two factors. First, by the differences of income determined by criteria of age and length of service. Essentially, this means that young people as a rule earn less money for equal work performance, despite the fact that also as a rule, their consumer needs are greater. This inferiority manifests itself in a variety of specific forms, from labor legislation to unpaid work for children and youth in family businesses.

Secondly, the economic inferiority of the youth in production is generated by the segregation of jobs and positions within the production process. The labor market does not favor young people. The results of this segregation are seen in the higher rate of unemployment, disqualification, work accidents, hard and uncomfortable work, etc., among the young.

The objective of the youth policy in this respect is to reduce the differences of pay between young and adult workers, and to adjust young people's incomes to their specific consumer needs (housing, their own family, etc.). On the other hand, it must also offer young people equal chances of occupying jobs comparable to the adults'.

The Social-Cultural Demarginalization of Youth

These issues concern a complex reality featuring several important aspects:

1) The structure of the youth's thinking and behavior is such that their subordination and inferiority to adults becomes normal behavior and attitudes not only for the adults, but also for the young people. This leads to the creation of a generally accepted ideology of youth inferiority in the society.

2) The major social institutions—school, family, bureaucracies, media, etc.—are so constituted that young people normally find themselves in a situation of inferiority or subordination. Relationships between parent-children, teacher-student, experienced employee-newcomer, etc., are typical and defining relationships for these institutions.

The induced incapacity of the youth to autonomously reconstruct the culture of the society in which they live is at the root of the cultural marginalization.

The cultural production and consumption—in the restricted sense of art, literature, science, recreation, etc.—are on the one hand mechanisms that induce and ensure the reproduction of the cultural marginalization of the youth, and on the other, a form of existence of a culture dominated by adults.

Even what is known as "youth culture,"—the cultural products aimed at the youth and the cultural products

created by young people themselves—are in fact manipulatory derivatives of the dominant culture of the adults. At the same time, even the various “countercultures,” which initially were viewed as sources of demarginalization, ended up under the control of the institutions of adult culture.

The objectives of a youth policy in the area of culture can only be long-term objectives. Similarly, they cannot pursue a radical modification of the situation. The youth policy must not aim at replacing one absolute source of cultural authority—the adults—by another—the youth—but must utilize the youth as a possible source of authority.

The Political Demarginalization of Youth

The core of the political marginalization of the youth consists of limiting or barring their access to decision-making in all social areas. At the same time, this is the most obvious aspect of marginalization and the one that is currently the major objective of the youth movements, to whom political marginalization appears as the first source of the conflict between youth and adults.

The political demarginalization of the youth presents two characteristics that must be taken into account: 1) It is far from being the most important; 2) it is the easiest to mimic.

Legislative and administrative measures can offer political forms of participation by the youth in decisionmaking, under which young people may represent either a mere adornment or a means of legitimizing the policy of the adults (as in the case of the youth organizations of political parties).

As in the case of society in general, political democracy does not become real except as an expression of economic, social, and cultural democracy. The political demarginalization of youth is an outcome and a form of political organization of economically, socially, and culturally demarginalized youth.

This does not mean that securing the participation of young people in decisionmaking is either a secondary objective, or one for a later stage. To the extent that the mutual dependence among the areas of marginalization and the limits of the primarily political approaches to the problems of the youth are made conscious, the institutionalization of a form of access of the youth to decision-making can become an efficient means of general demarginalization.

[10 Feb pp 1,3]

[Text]

The Autonomy of the Youth Policy

a) The Youth Policy and the Parties

None of the strategic objectives of the youth policy directly depends on any particular policy or on the goals

of the political parties. They stem from the characteristics of the youth and from the option of the youth policy.

Dependence on the options of political groups implies the following potential dysfunctions:

- the misappropriation of the youth policy by subordinating it to non-specific objectives;
- lack of continuity, as an effect of the succession to power of various political parties;
- since the political parties represent the interests of a group (class, social category, etc.), they tend to favor that group, including the young people belonging to it, while ignoring the general problems of youth;
- at times of crisis and during preelectoral periods, the absence of an autonomous and uniform youth policy (independent from the various political options and concerning the general issues of the youth) tends to rally the youth behind the political programs that feature explicit references to young people. The risk is that in such cases, at least some of the youth may only serve to promote non-specific interests. At the same time, later, because of the real concerns of the party policy, this support cannot guarantee the demarginalization of the youth.

A consistent and efficient youth policy must thus be independent of party politics. This means that it must also be independent of the government, i.e., of governmental organizations.

b) The Youth Policy and the State

Just as the youth policy may not be subordinated to political parties, so it should not be left entirely up to the state.

Aside from the fact that, in the last analysis, state policy reflects the political options of the party in power (regardless of how many constitutional guarantees may be provided for the separation of the political power from the state power), it is aimed at ensuring the achievement of major options concerning the society in general. On the other hand, ensuring an optimal condition for society—regardless of the specific contents of this term—does not necessarily require ensuring an optimal condition for the youth as one category of the society as a whole.

At the same time, the youth policy may not be reduced to state social assistance programs. Those are undisputably necessary, but by their very nature they cannot be a component of the youth policy. To begin with, because any social assistance program for the youth is based on its marginalized condition as a given reality recognized as such, and does nothing but sanction and foster it. It would thus attempt only to limit its effect, rather than eliminate its causes. Secondly, any social assistance program would solve only individual or extreme cases, without relating to the social category to which those cases belong. Such programs are useful to handle the

difficult problems of some young people, but have no effect on overall youth issues.

On the other hand, the relationship between the state and a possible youth policy is of necessity more complex than the mere assertion of the need for the latter's independence.

An efficient and consistent youth policy can only be achieved through institutional state structures. Naturally, such structures can be envisaged as the outcome of private initiatives or as belonging to civic (trade unions, association, etc.), religious, philanthropic, or other organizations. But in this case the chances of achieving and maintaining the initial objectives are far smaller than through a state institution. Not only because of the naturally more limited resources and smaller scope of such organizations, but also because of the nature of their major objectives, which are always partial.

To a certain extent, having the youth policy institutionalized within the state would tend to make that policy dependent on the state policy. What can be tried with comparatively better chances than other alternatives, is to keep this dependence as limited as possible. Thus, in optimal conditions, the dependence may be restricted to matters regarding finances and resources, without at the same time involving major interference in matters of substance.

Such an institution can be formed as an instrument of youth pressure on society, a pressure that even the state may view as necessary and useful from the viewpoint of social regulation. In its relations with the state, this institution could be financed from the budget, and its role can be to work out strategies for demarginalizing youth, and then to promote them as objectives of the state policy.

[13 Feb p 3]

[Text]

c) The Youth Policy and Youth Organizations

However paradoxical it may seem, the youth policy must also be autonomous in relation to youth organizations—each one separately and the youth movement as a whole. To a large extent, the arguments used for political parties also apply to youth organizations, especially if the latter are mere extensions of the various parties among the youth. However, there are additional arguments concerning trade union organizations that have specific youth policy objectives. The tendency of a youth movement of this type is not to modify the essential relations that generate the marginalization of one category of the population, but only the category it supports, tending to replace the marginalization of the youth with the marginalization of other categories, thus transforming the youth into a privileged group.

Moreover, if the youth organizations propose to eliminate those aspects of the marginalization that have

already become obvious, they can do or promote that in such a way as to promote acceptance or accentuation of other, less obvious but often more important aspects of marginalization. Thus, for example, they may tend to give priority to political demarginalization over economic.

As in the case of the parties, the institutionalization of the youth policy at state level reduces the risk of having it monopolized by a certain organization or a coalition of youth organizations.

In view of the goal and need to ensure autonomy, the youth policy lacks the support basis of a party or social class. Not even the youth as a whole, or because of its very marginalization, can provide a social basis capable of establishing and sustaining a realistic and consistent youth policy. On the other hand, the chances of a youth policy are linked precisely to this marginalization of the youth, because, if it becomes serious, it can impose itself as a "hard" option in the case in which it risks to unleash major social imbalances.

Naturally, the youth policy should not impose itself only as a response to a situation of crisis. The marginalization of youth is a reality, and doing something about it must not be postponed until it becomes intolerable.

The absence of a real social basis at other times than during crises is responsible for the instability and weaknesses of the youth policy and of the institutions designated to carry it out. Currently, we are in the midst of such a period and it is difficult to believe that an institution designed to implement the options of a youth policy can function efficiently relying only on the goodwill of its members and the understanding of the decisionmaking factors.

The only real support on which the youth policy can count is a public opinion strong and stable enough to exercise continuous pressure toward the demarginalization of the youth. The young people themselves can constitute, at least in the initial phase, the main moving force of such an orientation. The necessary condition for such a development to meet the objectives of the youth policy is that young people become conscious of all the specific issues of marginalization. This condition is not, however, sufficient. Statistically and socially significant groups from among the rest of the population must join this nucleus of public opinion. For that, though, it is absolutely necessary that the demarginalization of the youth be viewed by those groups as favorable conditions for fulfilling their own objectives.

d) The Levers of the Youth Policy

An autonomous and coherent youth policy has no chance of succeeding if it limits itself to mere declarations of principle, however pertinent. To be efficient, it must have an appropriate means of promotion, practical actions, and control.

We do not propose to list those whose usefulness is obvious (institutionalization, financial and material resources, personnel, publications, etc.).

Two aspects seem to us essential: a) implementing the objectives of the youth policy, and b) forming a public opinion sensitive to the issues of all categories of young people.

Although from an institutional viewpoint both require the institutionalization and legitimation of the youth policy, from a structural viewpoint there are a number of specific differences.

Thus, while in the first case, the main levers consist of establishing a system of indexes to permit understanding of the real situation of various categories of youth, on the basis of which various action scenarios are to be developed—both general and individual ones—featuring both

costs and possible social effects; in the second case, the main levers are aimed at structuring public opinion so as to allow the society to evaluate and control the practical consequences brought about by the youth policy.

In a democratic society, the evaluation and monitoring of an autonomous and coherent youth policy should not be limited to the role of scientific institutions whose object is to study the youth. The risk of such institutions becoming bureaucratic must be taken into account.

On the other hand, the above mentioned objectives require the current National Youth Commission to promote demarginalization plans as a quasi-political option. The main direction of action along this line must be to promote the interests of the youth at the level of the planning democratic institutions that are currently taking shape: the parliament and the senate. The youth must not be paternalistically excluded from those bodies.

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